



EXPORTING PREVENT

The UK government's complicity in rights-violating counter-extremism programmes in Indonesia



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Foreword

Rights & Security International's report *Exporting Prevent: The UK government's complicity in rights-violating counter-extremism programmes in Indonesia* is one of very few studies uncovering human rights concerns from the cooperation between the UK and Indonesian governments on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) projects.

In Indonesia, P/CVE debates are mostly dominated by security analysts, who describe the projects as successful. Furthermore, these security analysts are also able to influence Indonesia's population - citizens of the largest Muslim country in the world - to denounce what they define as religious extremism. This report, however, manages to uncover the dark side of P/CVE projects in the country, costing serious human rights violations to Indonesian religious minorities, indigenous Papuan peoples and other people peacefully criticising the Indonesian government's policies.

Many Indonesian human rights groups have reported how P/CVE projects are misused to marginalise religious minorities and suppress peaceful calls for Papuan independence by accusing them of supporting 'terrorist' groups. The government has also removed employees of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) who have been critical of the country's practices, by labelling them as 'Taliban'.

These reports, however, did not delve into the UK's contribution to Indonesia's P/CVE projects, and the human rights violations to which they contribute. RSI's report provides an excellent explanation of how the exporting of the UK's P/CVE projects to Indonesia has not only neglected systemic human rights violations in West Papua, persecution against religious minorities and shrinking civic space in Indonesia, but also follows the UK's own flawed approach to P/CVE.

Interestingly, my UK-based human rights friends tell me that, in recent years, UK politics has experienced 'Indonesianization', with UK government officials and other politicians labelling critics and political opponents as 'extremists' who try 'to tear the UK apart', fuelling fear among the population. For instance, on 9 March 2024, I participated in the large pro-ceasefire march in London.

I joined the march wanting to test whether it was true that, according to the UK's Commissioner for Countering Extremism, the march would be 'permissive environment for radicalisation'. But I saw the contrary. Most of the protest's chants were about human rights and called for the cessation of armed clashes.

In Indonesia, we often hear government officials and politicians labelling non-mainstream religious minorities and Papuan activists as 'extremists'. In recent years, the Indonesian government has also increased its hostility towards environmental human rights defenders, who are critical to the country's economic development strategy. It seems that both countries' P/CVE approaches perpetrate human rights harms, despite claiming to be methods of upholding human rights in the first place.

This report can also contribute to the evolution of international human rights law and standards, given what we now know about how governments like the UK's help to create human rights harms in other countries.

This report is a worthwhile read for anyone wanting to know about how governments work together to create harmful P/CVE programmes.

Papang Hidayat
Indonesian human rights defender
March 2024

Executive Summary

- The Indonesian government's approach to preventing and countering what it regards as violent 'extremism' (P/CVE) violates human rights, and the UK is complicit in these harms.¹
- The Indonesian government's approach to countering 'extremism' has resulted in widely reported allegations of unlawful killings, torture and other ill-treatment, enforced disappearances and other serious rights violations, and it has had a disproportionate impact on minority Muslim communities as well as people in Papua/West Papua. The Indonesian approach to P/CVE also harms the freedoms of religion and expression.
- Based on our research, we conclude that the UK government's support for rights-violating P/CVE in Indonesia is clear and direct. The UK government has supported these rights-violating P/CVE efforts through funding, particularly via the International Prevent Programme (IPP) within the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). The UK's funding involves support for several problematic practices, including those promoting 'religious moderation' and 'moderate Islam' as well as those involving 'community' policing. We also provide evidence that the UK furnished the Indonesian government with advice and assistance in the creation of the country's National Action Plan on P/CVE (RAN CVE).
- The UK's support also runs deeper; we find that the UK's international P/CVE efforts are in fact designed to provide support to other governments' police and military, despite P/CVE not being a policing or military function in the UK. In Indonesia, this tangible support has occurred through the UK sending trainers to train police officers at the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Co-operation (JCLEC). Some of these officers have then allegedly gone on to commit serious crimes.
- The collaboration between the UK and Indonesia appears to be occurring for political reasons. The Indonesian government's immediate priority over the past two years has been the 2024 election, which took place on 14 February 2024, and we conclude that P/CVE has been, and will continue to be, one of its ways of gaining popular support. The government relies on doctrines such as Pancasila (Indonesia's official philosophical theory) and 'religious moderation' to gain public support for its security strategies, while targeting Muslim communities and those in Papua/West Papua that the government claims want to 'overthrow' it. At the same time, the government appears to want to show that it is more competent than the military on security issues, given the ongoing dispute between these two actors for political power and popular support.
- This political backdrop has created an opening for the UK government to intervene for its own political reasons. Following the UK's exit from the European Union, the government has turned its attention to other areas of the world where it believes it can conclude jointly beneficial trade agreements and, ultimately, wield political influence.
- We conclude that the UK has become increasingly reliant on exporting, funding and otherwise supporting so-called P/CVE tactics as part of its post-Brexit diplomatic and trade strategy, with its collaboration with the Indonesian government serving as one example.

“ ...the UK has become increasingly reliant on exporting, funding and otherwise supporting so-called P/CVE tactics... post-Brexit ”

¹A note on terminology: while the Indonesian government's strategy refers specifically to extremism which leads to violence, in practice we see that it focuses more broadly on extremism that is not linked to violence, while also using its own interpretation of what amounts to an 'extreme' belief. We refer to P/CVE throughout this report, to follow the Indonesian government's terminology.

Executive Summary

- The most recent available figures show that the UK spends up to £7 million per year on its international P/CVE engagement (although, as we address, the true figure could be much higher). This is at a time when the government appears unwilling or unable to respond to increasing poverty across the UK itself; instead, it is committing resources to training police and military forces that persistently kill their own citizens due to the beliefs those citizens hold.
- With limited trade opportunities on offer, the UK government appears to have realised that it can offer its P/CVE strategies and resources to other countries as a way of allowing those countries to achieve political goals that involve silencing people who critique government policy. We know the UK government is aware that around the world, governments can and do misuse P/CVE tactics for repression, as in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation – and in the Papua/West Papua region of Indonesia. Yet, the UK government appears willing to disregard human rights concerns as it advocates for trade deals with countries that wish to use such oppressive strategies.
- The UK government also recognises that Prevent-like P/CVE policies are an easy sell in countries such as Indonesia, which has a large Muslim population but officially secular stance; the government has been able to use Indonesia's stated goal of promoting 'religious tolerance' as a cover for ignoring human rights violations. At the same time, the UK appears to view the spread of increasingly 'extremist Islamist ideology' towards Europe as a threat, and to fear that instability in Indonesia could somehow lead to violence or instability in Britain, even though few people from Indonesia or with family connections there live in the UK and there appears to be no evidence-based reason for believing that political or other changes in Indonesia would threaten public safety in the UK.
- Further, the post-Brexit UK is seeking to boost its global political power, and specifically to enhance its regional influence over southeast Asia – summarised by the government's 'tilt towards the Indo-Pacific', which it announced in 2021.
- Currently lagging behind the United States and Australia when it comes to influence in the region, the UK government wants to increase its political sway while also warding off a growing threat it perceives from China. UK government documents call for increased military and other support as part of this 'tilt', including through the means outlined in this report.
- Finally, we conclude that the UK government's global P/CVE strategy is underpinned by a fear of Islam as well as a willingness to exploit such fears elsewhere. The government recognises that Prevent-style P/CVE policies may be compelling to a country such as Indonesia, which has a large Muslim population but is officially secular, and has a demonstrated interest in controlling the exercise of religion and repressing religious minorities. At the same time, the UK government is concerned about how instability in Indonesia could impact the UK and contribute to what it perceives as a spread of 'extremist Islamist ideology' towards Europe. Simply put, the two governments' goals fit hand-in-glove.
- The UK government is or should be aware of the repressive manner in which its Indonesian counterparts operate in Papua/West Papua, including through P/CVE operations. However, the UK government appears to find it politically convenient to ignore potentially serious human rights violations in the region, including those committed by officers whom UK forces have trained. Ultimately, the UK government appears to see these rights violations as an acceptable price to pay for increased trade and security influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
- We conclude that the UK government has created conditions in which it can support repressive and rights-violating behaviours in the name of P/CVE without repercussions, by creating toothless accountability mechanisms. By creating an opaque and weak review process for its international assistance programmes, the UK government provides an appearance of accountability whilst ensuring that it retains the power to support repressive P/CVE strategies across the globe.

Executive Summary

- We recommend that the UK government scrap its International Prevent Programme – the programme through which it funds its international Prevent work – and reform how it assists other governments in creating new national security-related laws and policies. The UK should strictly adhere to the letter and spirit of its own human rights obligations, and not enable other countries in violating theirs, particularly when it comes to alleged abuses as grave as killings, torture and enforced disappearances. We also recommend that the UK reform how it trains and otherwise assists other countries’ police and military forces in violence prevention, and amend the process through which the UK authorises international assistance, for instance by adding greater transparency to the decision-making process. Each of these reforms would go a long way to ensuring the UK government upholds the country’s human rights obligations and is not helping other countries wage shadow wars or engage in deadly repression.



Introduction and Methodology

The web of international involvement in counter-terrorism (CT) operations in Indonesia is complex, with a range of governments supporting and influencing the Indonesian approach. However, the UK is extensively involved, even though it remains the third most significant actor (behind Australia and the US), in terms of overall support.² The UK government also appears to want a much greater role in Indonesia as part of its ‘tilt towards the Indo-Pacific’, and this includes strong collaboration and influence on what it describes as counter-terrorism measures.³

This report assesses the UK government’s role in supporting potentially rights-violating preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) practices in Indonesia. Here, we do not address concerns related to a lack of settled international definitions of ‘terrorism’ or ‘extremism’, or whether it is possible to define these concepts consistently and without harming rights.

Instead, in light of the reality that governments such as the UK’s have embraced the idea of P/CVE, we provide a snapshot of the reality of what P/CVE in Indonesia entails and assess whether the UK is having adequate regard for human rights when engaging with its Indonesian counterparts on P/CVE – or whether, conversely, the UK is ignoring or even facilitating rights violations of which it should be aware.⁴

In addition to carrying out desk-based research for this report, RSI consulted with a range of academics, civil society representatives and P/CVE practitioners between January 2022 and April 2023. These individuals were mainly based in Indonesia, the UK and the US; some were based in other countries but had extensive experience researching or working on P/CVE in Indonesia. The consultees for this report often had diverging views on how to conduct P/CVE effectively (whatever that might mean to them) and in compliance with human rights laws; however, there were areas in which views converged.

To promote candour regarding politically sensitive topics, and in some cases in the interest of safety, we have described these areas of consensus or diverging opinions without naming specific interviewees.

RSI’s researcher also interviewed members of Komnas Perempuan, one of Indonesia’s national human rights institutions, which focuses on women’s rights. These conversations helped inform the other research we conducted. We also submitted a freedom of information request to the UK government about its role in P/CVE in Indonesia, a request which was declined.

We would like to thank all of the individuals who spoke with us to provide their insight into the topics addressed in this report.

RSI’s researcher also conducted desk research from May 2022 to September 2023. This research involved a review of publicly available UK and Indonesian government documents such as laws, policies and diplomatic correspondence; news reports from Indonesian, UK and other sources; and academic commentary. Our research also involved scrutiny of the UK’s ‘Aid Tracker’, a government database of publicly available information on official development assistance that the UK provides.

Many of the documents and websites referenced in this report are only available in Bahasa Indonesia, a language not widely spoken in the United Kingdom (where RSI is based). Several individuals and organisations, including a consultant whom RSI retained, assisted the researcher by providing translations or English versions. When unavoidable, we have used Google Translate, whilst taking account of the potential for inaccuracies.

²Consultation participants frequently made this comment during the interviews. On Australian involvement, see Shara Yosevina Simanjuntak, ‘[Analisis Kerja Sama Bilateral Indonesia Dengan Australia Dalam Penanggulangan Terrorisme Sebagai Kejahatan Transnasional Terorganisir \(2002-2015\)](#)’ (2016) 2(3) Journal of International Relations 117; Philipp Ivanov, ‘[Anthony Albanese Must Be More Than a National Security Prime Minister](#)’ (The Diplomat, 2022); John Coyne, ‘[The future of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation](#)’ (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017); Marni Cordell, ‘[Australia trained Indonesian police officer accused of West Papua violence](#)’ (The Guardian, 2 August 2021). On US involvement, see U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, ‘[U.S. Relations With Indonesia: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet](#)’ (U.S. Department of State, 19 April 2022); Frega Wenas Inkiwang, ‘[The dynamic of the US–Indonesia defence relations: the ‘IMET ban’ period](#)’ (2020) 74(4) Australian Journal of International Affairs 377; David Capie, ‘[Between a hegemon and a hard place: the ‘war on terror’ and Southeast Asian–US relations](#)’ (2004) 17(2) The Pacific Review 223.

³For more information, see Louisa Brooke-Holland, ‘[Research Briefing – Integrated Review 2021: The Defence tilt to the Indo-Pacific](#)’, CBP 09217 (11 October 2021); Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and James Cleverly, ‘[Indo-Pacific tilt: Foreign Secretary’s speech, September 2022](#)’ (Gov.uk, 29 September 2022).

⁴See, for instance, Bernard Loesi, ‘[Billions spent on overseas counterterrorism would be better spent by involving ex-terrorists](#)’ (The Conversation, 6 May 2022). For a perspective on the efficacy of Indonesia’s P/CVE programming, see Alif Satria, ‘[After the Astana Anyar Bombing: A Critical Overview of Indonesia’s CVE System](#)’ (The Diplomat, 15 December 2022).

Part One: The Indonesian approach to P/CVE

'[We need to s]trengthen collaboration through a multi-stakeholder approach to counter-terrorism together, embrace young people, promote religious moderation as well as strengthen nationalism, monitor and supervise social media, especially ahead of the 2024 elections.'

Indonesian Vice President Ma'ruf Amin (speech at the 13th Annual Commemoration of the Creation of the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, Jakarta, 28 July 2023)⁵

The Indonesian government's approach to P/CVE is all-encompassing. It engages public bodies, the police, the military, schools, religious institutions and even whole communities. Over its 105 pages, the government's National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism 2020-2024 (RAN CVE) – enacted in January 2021 by presidential regulation – gives P/CVE authority to 41 different public bodies; it also gives ordinary Indonesians a role, encouraging them to report on their neighbours when they see signs of 'extremism'.⁶

In this first part of this report, we analyse the human rights harms that stem from the Indonesian government's approach to P/CVE; however, such an analysis only gives us half the picture. It is helpful to step back and interrogate why governments use P/CVE programmes.

From the Indonesian government's perspective, experts in Indonesian politics tell us its immediate priority for the past two years has been the 2024 election, which took place on 14 February – and P/CVE has been, and will continue to be, one way of gaining public support and ultimately votes.

The government has long relied on doctrines such as Pancasila – Indonesia's constitutional philosophy, which

among other things, promotes 'national unity' – 'religious moderation' and 'religious tolerance' to gain public support for its security strategies; in practice, this has meant targeting minority Muslim communities and those in Papua/West Papua, which the government argues want to 'overthrow' it. At the same time, the government wants to show that it is more competent than the military on security issues, given the ongoing contest between these two actors for political power and popular support.

The Indonesian government's rhetoric around security issues has demonstrated a politicised approach to P/CVE as the 2024 election looms. In March 2023, the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT; Indonesia's national counter-terrorism agency) reported that it was beginning to monitor signs of 'extremist infiltration' in political parties across the country, and told the public, purportedly as reassurance, that it would continue to monitor and delist parties with any links to groups it deemed to be 'extremist'.⁷ (We also know that the Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, has access to intelligence information about opposition political parties, which includes information about their strategies for the upcoming elections.)⁸ This statement by the BNPT was followed in July by a government pronouncement urging the public to remain vigilant about a rise in extremism and a risk of terrorist attacks ahead of the election period.⁹

Indonesia does face a risk of violence, with designated terrorist entities carrying out attacks in the country on many occasions over the past few decades. However, P/CVE operations, specifically, appear to be serving political motives.¹⁰

In this section of the report, we begin by outlining the legal and institutional framework for P/CVE in Indonesia, as well as the various human rights concerns these laws, policies and practices raise. This provides a platform for the second part of the report, in which we examine the UK government's support for these harmful practices.

⁵Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, 'Kepala BNPT RI: Indonesia Tidak Boleh Lengah Hadapi Gerakan Radikalisme di Bawah Permukaan' (BNPT, 28 July 2023). Translated from Bahasa Indonesia: 'Perkuat kolaborasi melalui pendekatan multipihak tangkal terorisme secara bersama-sama, rangkul kalangan muda promosikan moderasi beragama sekaligus perkuat paham kebangsaan, monitor dan awasi media sosial terutama menjelang pemilu 2024.'

⁶Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024.

⁷Munira Mustaffa, 'The Memo: 5 Mar–14 Mar 2023' (The Memo, 14 March 2023).

⁸Nazarudin Latif and Pizaro Gozali Idrus, 'Democracy activists say Indonesian president spying on political parties is 'scandalous'' (Benar News, 18 September 2023).

⁹Hidayat Salam, 'Beware of Terror Threats Ahead of the 2024 Election' (Kompas, 6 July 2023).

¹⁰For a history of terrorism in Indonesia, see Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jama'ah Islamiyah (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 2013).

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR P/CVE IN INDONESIA

- Indonesian law contains a complex legal and institutional framework to regulate national security matters, including counter-terrorism and P/CVE.
- Indonesian law also includes a framework to protect human rights, although there are some gaps - for instance, the limited protection against enforced disappearances.
- In 2021, the Indonesian government created the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024 (RAN CVE). This is a lengthy and detailed strategy that applies to the whole of government and society.
- Many government bodies have responsibilities under the RAN CVE.

In Indonesia, the legal and institutional framework for counter-terrorism operations is complex. This is particularly the case for P/CVE, with multiple pieces of legislation regulating this field and many institutions involved in policy- and decision-making, as well as P/CVE operations. This section aims to distil some of these complexities.

Human Rights Law and Responsibilities

Indonesia has ratified most of the major international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW).¹² However, the country has yet to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED), despite signing the treaty in 2010.¹³ Indonesia also has yet to ratify many of the optional protocols to these treaties, meaning that its citizens are unable to make individual complaints to many of the UN's treaty bodies when they believe the government has violated their rights. Especially in countries such as Indonesia that do not fall under the jurisdiction of an international human rights court, complaints to UN treaty bodies are one of the main options people may have for seeking justice at the international level.

The Indonesian legislature has taken steps to implement these international human rights laws, after deciding that the prior legislative framework was inadequate to ensure respect for them.¹⁴ The government has also passed some legislation that legal commentators and human rights groups see as improving access to justice for human rights violations in the country, for instance by allowing people to bring cases before the domestic courts about human-rights-related issues.¹⁵

¹²For an accessible overview of Indonesian law, see Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt, *Indonesian Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). RSI's prior report, Rights & Security International, 'Indonesia: National Security and Human Rights Background' (2021), details some additional historical, legal and constitutional considerations at paras. 1-29.

¹³To see the international human rights treaties that the Indonesian government has ratified, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Ratification Status for Indonesia' (UN Human Rights Treaty Body Database, no date).

¹⁴International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, New York, 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010, 2716 UNTS 3.

¹⁵Including, among other laws and regulations, Law No. 7 of 1984 on Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Presidential Decision No. 181 of 1998 on the Formation of the National Commission of Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan); Presidential Regulation No. 65 of 2005 on Komnas Perempuan; Law No. 23 of 2003 on Child Protection; Law No. 21 of 2007 on the Elimination of Human Trafficking; Presidential Decision No. 36 of 1990 on the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

¹⁶See, e.g., Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights; Law No. 26 of 2000 on Establishing the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court.

In practice, however, observers have criticised both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court – the courts with primary responsibility for interpreting and applying human rights laws – for their failure to act as an adequate check on the executive.¹⁶

Indonesia's constitution also contains fundamental human rights protections, including protections for the right to life, the right to freedom of religion, and the right to freedom of expression. The constitution also requires the government to take measures to protect rights.¹⁷ Human rights activists at the time saw the adoption of these protections as a momentous legal development following former president Soeharto's resignation in 1998.¹⁸

However, the constitution also allows the legislature to pass statutes that limit these rights, when those statutes aim to 'protect[] the rights and freedoms of others and ... accord with moral considerations, religious values, security and public order in a democratic society'.¹⁹

Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt – experts on Indonesian law – have argued that Indonesia's Constitutional Court has applied this clause expansively to uphold laws that fundamentally breach constitutional rights, even when the constitution designates those rights as non-derogable: for example, when the court permitted the use of the death penalty for drug trafficking offences.²⁰ (In law, a non-derogable right is one that the government cannot make the subject of any exceptions, even in emergencies.)

Theoretically, the human rights provisions of the constitution protect everyone, although there are different levels of protection depending on whether the individual in question is an Indonesian citizen.²¹

As we discuss further below, the government frequently refers to non-binding 'human rights principles' and the Pancasila doctrine – Indonesia's official philosophical theory, which gives only six religions 'official' status – as justifications for preventing certain groups from exercising their rights, an issue that arises particularly in the formulation and use of CT and P/CVE laws and policies.

Law, policy and practice of P/CVE

The Indonesian government has introduced many laws and regulations governing counter-terrorism operations in the country.²² As we discuss elsewhere, the legislature and executive often skirt human rights laws when creating P/CVE law and policy, instead referring to softer 'human rights principles', which therefore only form part of the legislative background rather than creating binding rules. This means the government can act in a way that is inconsistent with its human rights obligations.

“ the legislature and executive often skirt human rights laws when creating P/CVE law and policy, instead referring to softer 'human rights principles', which therefore only form part of the legislative background rather than creating binding rules. ”

¹⁶See the summary provided in Rights & Security International, 'Indonesia: National Security and Human Rights Background' (2021), paras. 13-14.

¹⁷Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 1945, amended through 2002, Articles 28A-J. Article 28(4) of the Constitution reinforces the state's constitutional obligation to protect human rights: it mandates that '[p]rotection, improvement, reinforcement, and fulfillment of human rights shall be the responsibility of the state, particularly the government.'

¹⁸For more information, see Harold Crouch, *Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto* (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: 2010), pp. 43-86; Todung Mulya Lubis, 'Constitutional Reforms', in Hadi Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith and Han Mui Ling (eds.), *Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010); Tim Lindsey, 'Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy', (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 244; Leli Tibaka and Rosdian, 'The Protection of Human Rights in Indonesian Constitutional Law after the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia' (2017) 11(3) Fiat Justisia 266.

¹⁹Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 1945, amended through 2002, Article 28J(2).

²⁰Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt, *Indonesian Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 245; Simon Butt, 'Judicial Reasoning and Review in the Indonesian Supreme Court' (2019) 6(1) Asian Journal of Law and Society 67, pp. 67-69. *Constitutional Court Decisions 2/PUU-V/2007 and 3/PUU-V/2007*. See also, Natalie Zerial, 'Decision No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007 [2007] (Indonesian Constitutional Court)' (2007) 14 Australian International Law Journal 217.

²¹For an overview, see Utami Argawati, 'Indonesian Constitution Protects Human Rights of Everyone Including Foreign Nationals' (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 17 January 2023).

²²For an overview of counter-terrorism law in Indonesia, see Institute for Criminal Justice Reform, 'Indonesia's Legal Framework on Terrorism' (2018) 3 Indonesia Criminal Law Update; Rights & Security International, 'Indonesia: National Security and Human Rights Background' (2021), paras. 21-29.

In 2021, the Indonesian government used a presidential regulation – that is, a law the government enacts under the authority of the constitution, as opposed to the usual legislative process, with a view to creating policy – to create the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024 (RAN CVE).²³ The RAN CVE claims to do many things when it comes to combatting what the government regards as ‘extremism’: it creates an ‘early detection system and community-based early response system’ to encourage communities to monitor their neighbours and report people they think may be at risk of engaging in extremism (for instance, because they hold ‘deviant’ religious views); it creates a range of capacity-building initiatives for (among others) educators, religious leaders and communities as a whole to allow them to respond to ‘extremism’; and it seeks to ensure that such actors can persuade people to adopt more ‘religiously moderate’ views.²⁴

The strategy also describes several ‘deradicalisation’ methods targeted at former members of designated terrorist groups, for use both inside and outside prisons.²⁵

The government presents the RAN CVE as a ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of society’ approach to P/CVE, formally giving various government departments responsibilities for implementing and monitoring P/CVE operations.

However, the regulations leave much of the actual implementation of the strategy to local communities, educators and religious figures. This setup allows the government to engrain P/CVE in communities and everyday life.

While the Indonesian government has created an extensive legal framework to criminalise a wide range of ‘terrorism’- and ‘extremism’-related acts, the logistical framework for monitoring and implementing P/CVE and CT laws and policies is more complex and less clear.²⁶ In sum, while many state actors are involved in P/CVE and CT initiatives in Indonesia, there remains a dispute between the police and the military about who is best placed to lead these operations (with both organisations wanting primary responsibility), including an argument about whether and how the military should become involved in law enforcement operations, and even in politics.²⁷

Through the RAN CVE, the government has also created a new institutional framework to support the execution of the strategy: a Joint Secretariat (Sekretaris Bersama) is responsible for implementing it. The Joint Secretariat consists of several ministries and institutions across different fields, including politics, law and security; human development and culture; and national development, internal affairs and foreign affairs. However, the RAN CVE reserves primary responsibility for Indonesia’s counter-terrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme (BNPT).

Every six months, the Joint Secretariat meets to coordinate the implementation of the RAN CVE. It is funded through national and regional budgets, and can also receive funding from other sources from inside and outside the country. In implementing its role, the Joint Secretariat can also work with civil society.²⁸

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²³Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024.

²⁴See Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 18-19, pp. 22-27, 39-44 and pp. 31-39 respectively.

²⁵Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 48-83.

²⁶Although many government powers and responsibilities are decentralised in Indonesia, as a result of [Law No. 22/99 concerning Regional Administrations](#), the national government retains control over national security, defence, foreign policy, justice and religious affairs.

²⁷Generally, see Muhamad Arif, ‘[On the Role of the Indonesian Military in Counterterrorism](#)’, *THC Insights* No. 17, 14 May 2020; Wasisto Raharjo Jati, ‘[The Situation of Declining Indonesian Democracy in 2021](#)’, *THC Insights* No. 27, 9 June 2021; Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge, ‘[The military’s role in Indonesia’s democracy. Misguided perception?](#)’ (2019) 84 *International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter*; Dedi Dinarto and Jefferson Ng Jin Chuan, ‘[4 reasons why more Indonesian military and police officers are running for regional elections](#)’, *The Conversation*, 10 March 2021). The military still has a large role in politics and law enforcement despite constitutional reforms in the post-Soeharto era; Butt and Lindsay explain that ‘[s]ome of the most important reforms they [the post-Soeharto government] introduced appear in Article 30(1) and (2) of the Constitution, which creates a distinction between external defence and internal security. The former remains the responsibility of the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian military). The latter—comprising internal security, law enforcement, and maintenance of public order—was handed to the Indonesian Police Force or Polri (Polisi Republik Indonesia), separated from the military to form a civilian organization. Article 30(5) also handed the power to regulate the respective authority and jurisdiction of TNI and Polri to the DPR.’; Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt, [Indonesian Law](#) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 20-21.

²⁸Through the [Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme Regulation No. 5/2021 on Coordination, Supervision, Evaluation, and Implementation of RAN CVE 2020-2024](#).

Through these regulations, the BNPT created three working groups: one on prevention, one on law enforcement as well as witness and victim protection, and one on international co-operation. It also established a thematic working group consisting of civil society stakeholders in the field of P/CVE. Members of each working group must submit two reports per year explaining how they have implemented their obligations under the regulations, while detailing any achievements and challenges from the past year and making recommendations for the following year's policy. See Figures A and B below for further information.

We now briefly outline the respective roles of the BNPT, Detachment 88 (often referred to as 'Densus 88'), the Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob), and the Indonesian military (TNI) – four of the key actors in implementing Indonesian P/CVE efforts.

The BNPT is the non-ministerial government department charged with preventing terrorism and violent extremism.²⁹ It reaches its objectives through creating 'national preparedness, counter terrorism radicalisation and de-radicalisation programmes', formulating national policies and programmes, and co-ordinating with other government departments on issues relating to CT.³⁰ It is composed of a chief and four deputies; the chief is directly appointed by, and reports to, the President. The BNPT's main duties include formulating national policies and programmes, co-ordinating cross-government implementation of policies and programmes, and implementing policies in the field of counter-terrorism by setting up task forces with members from government offices in line with their respective tasks, functions, and authorities. It led the reform efforts that resulted in the creation of the RAN CVE, and also acts as the Secretary for the Joint Secretariat on the operation and implementation of the RAN CVE.³¹

Densus 88 is a specialist anti-terrorism unit within the Indonesian National Police (Polri).³² It is principally funded by the US State Department and trained through the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC; see below).³³ Due to its policing role, it holds the same powers as the regular police to arrest or detain people and investigate potential criminal acts.³⁴ However, it also holds additional powers to assist in CT operations, including pre-trial detention – which is overseen by a district court – and the interception or monitoring of communications.³⁵ Human rights organisations and journalists have critiqued Densus 88 for a range of alleged human rights violations resulting from a claimed 'shoot first' policy.³⁶



²⁹It is governed by [Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 on Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2018](#). The BNPT was formed by [Presidential Regulation No. 46 of 2010 on the Creation of the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorism](#).

³⁰[Regulation No. 77/2019 on the Prevention of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges and Correctional Officers](#). For an overview of how the RAN operates under this Regulation, see Irine Gayatri, 'Lessons Learnt: Sustained Collaboration among State and Non-State Actors in the Implementation of the P/CVE NAP at the Local Level' (SEAN-CSO, 15 December 2022).

³¹By virtue of [BNPT Regulation No. 5 of 2021 on Procedures for Coordination, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting on the Implementation of the National Action Plan on Overcoming Violence Based Extremism Leading to Terrorism 2020-2024](#), Article 2 and [Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024](#), Article 5.

³²For the organisation's structure, see the diagram in Muradi, 'The 88th Densus AT: The Role and the Problem of Coordination on Counter Terrorism in Indonesia' (2009) 2(3) *Journal of Politics and Law* 85, p. 96.

³³We do not discuss the US's role in counter-terrorism and P/CVE operations in this report; for an explanation of the US government's role, see Aji Tito Harwanto, 'Implementasi Kerja Sama Indonesia-Amerika Serikat Dalam Counter Terrorism: Hasil Program Diplomatic Security Service Antiterrorism Assistance Terhadap Kasus Terorisme di Indonesia Tahun 2003-2014' (2016) 2(1) *Journal of International Relations* 18.

³⁴See [Law No. 2 of 2002 on the State Police of the Republic of Indonesia](#).

³⁵[Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 on Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2018](#).

³⁶See Bama Andika Putra, 'Human Rights Concerns in Indonesia's Counterterrorism Policies: The Emergence of a Domestic Security Dilemma in Indonesia's Densus 88 Security Posture' (2020) 9(6) *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 206; Associated Press, 'Indonesia's US-funded anti-terror police accused of fuelling terrorism' (The Guardian, 7 January 2013).

Another Polri entity with the power to engage in CT exercises is Brimob, a specialist tactical unit of the police. There is an overlap between these entities' mandates, and they often conduct joint operations.³⁷

The Indonesian military is primarily responsible for defending the country's sovereignty, including by maintaining its 'territorial integrity'.³⁸ It also assists with internal security and emergency management operations when authorised to do so, as seen recently with the response to the fatal 2022 Kanjuruhan stadium crush during an Arema FC football match.³⁹ The police or the government are able to request military assistance when the police appear unable to deal with a particular incident; in practice, military officers frequently assist when the police fear community backlash to their operations – a common occurrence when engaging in CT or P/CVE operations.⁴⁰

Despite this delimitation of responsibilities, there remains significant debate between the military and the police about each body's respective roles, particularly when it comes to national security.⁴¹ Similarly, with the military (and to a lesser extent, the police) having previously held a large role in government, and the Indonesian government trying to minimise the military's political influence, it seems appropriate to view the country's approach to P/CVE in the context of the military, the police and the government all trying to 'out-securitise' the others when it comes to CT and P/CVE.⁴²

“ the military, the police and the government all try[] to 'out-securitise' the others when it comes to CT and P/CVE. ”

This competition to see which body can wield the most power regarding 'security' has real consequences, contributing to each body's willingness to stretch the limits of human rights laws and, allegedly, engage in the violations that we outline below.⁴³

As noted above, the BNPT leads the Joint Secretariat on the implementation of the RAN CVE. However, the strategy employs a 'whole of government' approach to P/CVE, with many government bodies holding different responsibilities for implementing the RAN. In terms of high-level policy implementation, government ministers and heads of departments are responsible for implementing the RAN within their departments' mandates, and similarly, local governors and mayors are required to do the same in the regions for which they are responsible. (As of 2020, Indonesia had 34 provinces, 514 regencies and 7160 districts.)⁴⁴

The RAN also designates tasks on a specific level: for instance, the Ministry of Education and Culture holds primary responsibility (with support from the BNPT) for developing critical thinking skills within the education curriculum, and the Ministry of Women

³⁷For example, see Rohan Gunaratna, 'The Inside Story of a Prison Takeover by Indonesian Terrorists' (Benar News, 24 May 2018). There are several anti-terrorism units within TNI and Polri, however Densus and Brimob appear to have the greatest role in practice: see in Muradi, 'The 88th Densus AT: The Role and the Problem of Coordination on Counter Terrorism in Indonesia' (2009) 2(3) Journal of Politics and Law 85.

³⁸Presidential Regulation No. 66/2019 on the Organization Structure of the Indonesian National Defense Forces. See also Presidential Decree No. 42/2019 on the Second Amendment to Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2010 Concerning the Organizational Structure of the Indonesian National Army and Commander of the Armed Forces Regulation No. 19/2019 on the Organization and Duties of the Special Operations Command of the Indonesian Armed Forces, which authorises the TNI's Koopssus Special Forces Unit to conduct special operations and activities 'to safeguard Indonesian national interests at home and abroad'.

³⁹See Emma Connors, 'Indonesian military police investigated over soccer match disaster' (Financial Review, 3 October 2022); Valdy Baraputri and Joel Guinto, 'Indonesia football crush: Officials jailed over Kanjuruhan stadium deaths' (BBC News, 9 March 2023).

⁴⁰The police or the government are able to request military assistance when the police appear unable to deal with a particular incident; in practice, military officers frequently assist when the police fear community backlash to their operations – a common occurrence when engaging in CT or P/CVE operations.

⁴¹This was an area of consensus among interviewees for this report. Further, see John McBeth, 'Why Indonesia's military and police can't get along' (Asia Times, 8 January 2019); Nigel D. White, Mary E. Footer, Kerry Senior, Mark van Dorp, Vincent Kiezebrink, Y. Wasi Gede Puraka and Ayudya Fajri Anzas, 'Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia: Corporate Interests and Human Rights in a Fragile Environment' (2018) 65 Netherland International Law Review.

⁴²On the role of the police in Indonesian politics, see Made Supriatma, 'The Indonesian police's dual function under Jokowi' (East Asia Forum, 6 October 2020); Robertus Robet, 'Civil society the key to preventing an Indonesian police state' (The Jakarta Post, 1 October 2022). On the military's role in Indonesian politics, see Natalie Sambhi, 'Generals gaining ground: Civil-military relations and democracy in Indonesia' (Brookings, 22 January 2021); Marcus Mietzner, 'Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation' (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). Further, see Deni Dinarto and Jefferson Ng Jin Chuan, '4 reasons why more Indonesian military and police officers are running for regional elections' (The Conversation, 10 March 2021).

⁴³See, for instance, Adhi Priamarizki, 'Indonesia's military still preoccupied with internal security' (East Asia Forum, 4 June 2021).

⁴⁴Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, Article 2. For these statistics, see OECD, 'OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Indonesia 2020' (Paris: OECD), Chapter 7. On decentralisation in Indonesia, see Anwar Nasution, 'Government Decentralization Program in Indonesia', Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper No. 601, October 2016; Tessa Talitha, Tommy Firman and Delik Hudalah, 'Welcoming two decades of decentralization in Indonesia: a regional development perspective' (2020) 5 Territory, Politics, Governance 670; Dennis Shoosmith, Nathan Franklin and Rachmat Hidayat, 'Decentralised Governance in Indonesia's Disadvantaged Regions: A Critique of the Underperforming Model of Local Governance in Eastern Indonesia' (2020) 39(3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 359.

Empowerment and Child Protection is primarily responsible (with support from 15 other entities, including Polri and the BNPT) for ensuring children are protected from what the government regards as radicalisation.⁴⁵

In terms of human rights protections, the RAN CVE is generally limited. While the government states that a ‘conducive condition’ to ‘radicalisation’ is the proliferation of ‘state-supported human rights violations and weak law enforcement’⁴⁶ – thus recognising that human rights violations can contribute to violence and conflict – the RAN devotes most of its focus to the human rights of victims of incidents described as ‘terrorist’ – that is, those committed by non-state actors. Indeed, in giving its statement on human rights in the RAN, the Presidential Regulation explains that the instrument:

‘aims to increase the protection of the right of citizens to the sense of security against violent extremism that leads to terrorism, as part of the implementation of state obligations towards human rights in order to maintain national security stability based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.’⁴⁷

In practice, as we discuss in the following section, the government and other institutions appear to see religious and other minority groups, as well as individuals who criticise government policy, as threats to ‘national security stability’, and violations of their rights are seen as acceptable or even desirable to ‘protect the right of citizens to the sense of security’. Meanwhile, the reliance on Pancasila as a constitutional principle – alongside the associated concept of ‘religious moderation’ – helps to give the government a legal basis for adopting discriminatory policies, a topic addressed below.⁴⁸

Finally, the RAN sets out the aforementioned ‘human rights principles’ as opposed to strict human rights commitments, which the drafters have only ‘taken into account’.⁴⁹ This framing further exacerbates the concerns we have about the strength of Indonesia’s regard for human rights obligations when it comes to counter-terrorism and counter-extremism laws and policies. This weak framework is a contributing factor to several serious human rights concerns, to which we now turn.



Photo by [Reffhad](#) on [Unsplash](#)

⁴⁵Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 31-35 and pp. 47-48 respectively.

⁴⁶Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, p. 9.

⁴⁷Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, Article 2(2). See also pp. 11-12.

⁴⁸We see similar references in the introduction to the RAN CVE, in which the government explains that ‘[t]he commitment to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in countering terrorism is an important part of the mandate of Pancasila, as a way of life as well as the ultimate source of law.’ (at p. 8).

⁴⁹Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, p. 10.

Figure A: Structures and membership of the Joint Secretariat of the RAN CVE⁵⁰





Figure B: Reporting mechanisms for RAN CVE implementation⁵¹



⁵⁰Figure reproduced and translated into English from BNPT Regulation No. 5 of 2021 on Procedures for Coordination, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting on the Implementation of the National Action Plan on Overcoming Violence Based Extremism Leading to Terrorism 2020-2024, p. 10.

⁵¹Figure reproduced and translated into English from BNPT Regulation No. 5 of 2021 on Procedures for Coordination, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting on the Implementation of the National Action Plan on Overcoming Violence Based Extremism Leading to Terrorism 2020-2024, p. 11.

ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM INDONESIA'S P/CVE STRATEGY

- Many alleged or potential human rights violations arise from Indonesia's counter-terrorism strategy, as well as its approach to P/CVE specifically. These include potentially unlawful killings and torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. We have also identified violations of the freedoms of religion, as well as concerns about the freedoms of expression and assembly.
- P/CVE practices in the country are potentially discriminatory, particularly with regard to religious minorities (especially those groups not officially recognised as part of Pancasila) and the indigenous Papuan community.
- While Indonesia is not the only state to use 'community policing', the way in which Indonesia uses it creates specific risks of discrimination – particularly religious discrimination. The police and military often react to intelligence (principally, civilians' claims that they know someone who holds 'extremist' beliefs) in a heavy-handed way. At the same time, there is often limited or no accountability when things go wrong.

- The Indonesian government also promotes 'religious moderation' or 'religious tolerance' as part of its P/CVE strategy. While these are not concepts unique to the country's P/CVE efforts, the government uses them to ostracise people who hold religious beliefs that are not covered by the Pancasila doctrine. The authorities use P/CVE to encourage people to change their religious beliefs to something the government sees as 'mainstream', violating the right to freedom of religion and belief.
- The Indonesian approach to CT and P/CVE in Papua/West Papua has led to widely reported allegations of serious human rights violations, including unlawful killings and enforced disappearances.

Researchers, journalists and other commentators have claimed that in practice, Indonesia's counter-terrorism strategy involves – among other human rights violations – torture, enforced disappearances, unlawful killings and censorship, notwithstanding the detailed legal framework set out above.⁵² Our analysis will focus on alleged and potential human rights violations that the available information links directly to P/CVE in the country.

We conclude that the Indonesian government uses P/CVE in a way that silences the people who are most likely to disagree with its policies, and uses language such as 'religious moderation' and 'religious tolerance' to gain public support for policies that limit fundamental freedoms for religious minorities and indigenous rights activists.

⁵²On torture, see Sheany, 'Torture Remains a Serious Problem in Indonesia: AHRC' (Jakarta Globe, 30 June 2017). On enforced disappearances, see Amnesty International, 'Indonesia: President Jokowi must fulfil promises on unresolved enforced disappearances cases' (Amnesty International, 30 August 2017); Aldo Marchiano Kaligis, 'I don't even know whether he is still alive or not': Enforced disappearances in Indonesia' (Ideas for Peace); Manotar Tampubolon, 'Enforced Disappearance and Untouching of the Perpetrators: The Case of Indonesia', in Conference Proceedings: 2019 – XXVI International Conference on Business, Economics, Law, Language & Psychology (ICBELLP) (Bali: EURASIA, 2019). On unlawful killings, see Sebastian Strangio, 'Indonesian Security Forces Responsible for Dozens of Extrajudicial Killings, Rights Group Says' (The Diplomat, 13 December 2022); V Arianti and Muh Taufiqurrohman, 'Extremist charities spread in Indonesia' (East Asia Forum, 17 March 2020); Mohammad Hasan Ansori, Imron Rasyid, Muhamad Arif, Sopar Peranto, Johari Efendi, Vidya Hutagalung, 'Memberantas Terorisme di Indonesia: Praktik Kebijakan dan Tantangan' (Habibie Center, August 2019), Chapter V; Pizaro Gozali Idrus and Tria Dianti, 'Activists blame Indonesian police, soldiers for dozens of extrajudicial killings' (Benar News, 9 December 2022). On censorship, see Imron Rasyid, Johari Efendi, Muhamad Arif, Nurina Vidya Hutagalung and Sopar Peranto, 'Civil Liberties and Democratization in ASEAN: Challenges and Recommendations for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand' (Habibie Center, 2019).

From the perspective of an individual or organisation that the government believes holds ‘extreme’ views, an underlying problem with the Indonesian government’s approach is that it lacks clarity and transparency. This creates a ‘chilling effect’, as individuals within religious or indigenous communities, academics, and civil servants whose views diverge from the government’s are constantly aware that the government – or even members of neighbouring communities – may flag their beliefs or opinions as ‘extremist’, with resulting surveillance or government pressure to change their views.⁵³

We note at the outset that under Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Indonesia is a party, everyone in the country has a right to ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, including the right to embrace beliefs of one’s choice. The state is not allowed to coerce people into changing or abandoning their religion or beliefs, and the freedom to manifest those beliefs (for example, by going to a house of worship) ‘may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’. This right is non-derogable, meaning that even during times of emergency, states are not allowed to modify or ignore it.

During our consultations, many respondents expressed concern about the Indonesian national government’s and other public bodies’ approaches to engaging with people and organisations they deem to hold ‘extreme’ views. Rather than engaging with openness and transparency, official approaches are premised on rumour and secrecy, according to these respondents. They described examples in which public bodies allegedly leaked the names of individuals or organisations they regarded as holding ‘extreme’ views, causing some of the harms discussed below.

Respondents claimed that when challenged, the government will often quickly backtrack on the leaks, alleging that the disclosures of information and the ‘extremist’ designations resulted from mistakes. However, by this stage, the harm has already been done.

“ official approaches [to P/CVE] are premised on rumour and secrecy ”

Many respondents also expressed doubts about the government’s claims that its leaks were accidental, given the frequency and consistency of these occurrences.

‘Community Policing’

‘Community policing’ is a strategy that police forces use in many different contexts, and many governments across the globe also use it in the name of countering ‘extremism’. In general, governments that embrace ‘community policing’ task the police with developing partnerships with the communities they serve.⁵⁴ Once police have established these relationships, they and the security services can use their connections within local communities to advocate against what they view as ‘terrorist’ or ‘extremist’ causes, gather information about people who may be involved in certain activities, or try to alter people’s religious or political beliefs.

While police engagement with communities could theoretically create mutual trust and understanding, the realities of power disparities mean that ‘community policing’ can lead to repression: the fact that police have state authorisation to use force means that the relationship between officers and community members is inherently unequal, and there is a risk that governments will use close connections between police and communities as a means of co-opting local people into carrying out government agendas.⁵⁵ We also note that from the perspective of international law, even non-forceful government attempts to influence people’s religious beliefs may violate human rights, as the freedoms of belief, thought and opinion are absolute.

⁵³On the civil service, see Konradus Epa, ‘New test aims to end extremism in Indonesian civil service’ (UCA News, 17 June 2021). On academia and universities, see A’an Suryana, ‘Religious Extremism in Major Campuses in Indonesia’, Trends in Southeast Asia Issue No. 6, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022.

⁵⁴David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, Jessica Toliver and Elizabeth Miller, ‘The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety’, (Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, January 2016), p. i. In the general context, see Gary W. Corder, ‘Community Policing: Elements And Effects’ (1995) 5(3) Police Forum 1; Peter K. Manning, ‘Community Policing’ (1983-1984) 3(2) American Journal of Police 205; Anneke Osse, ‘Understanding Policing: A resource for human rights activists’ (Amnesty International, 2012) pp. 95-96.

⁵⁵See Cynthia Gonzalez, ‘We’ve been here before: Countering violent extremism through community policing’ (2017-2018) 74 National Law Guild Review 1.

It is also important to recall that ‘communities’ are comprised of individuals, who will have their own varying levels of power and privilege and may have their own political goals. When governments adopt ‘community policing’, it is therefore important to ask with whom, specifically, the police are collaborating, and what the consequences may be for other local people.⁵⁶ This change derived from the desire to transform the police from a militaristic entity to one that held greater respect for democratic principles – a process that other public bodies underwent around the same time.⁵⁷ Since the beginning of this reform process, ‘community policing’ has formed a major part of the policing approach in the country: Article 4(a) of the National Police Chief’s Regulation on Community Policing sets out the meaning of the term by asserting that ‘the philosophy of the community policing looks at society as an active subject that maintains public security and order rather than a mere subject’.⁵⁸ Most recently, in 2021, the Chief of Police revived the Pam Swakarsa (Pasukan Pengamanan Masyarakat Swakarsa) – a group of civilians recruited and trained to act as community police – which, under the ‘New Order’, regime were a governmental paramilitary organisation formed to shut down student demonstrations on behalf of the military.⁵⁹

In Indonesia in the early 2000s, as with in other countries, the doctrine of ‘community policing’ had a slightly different meaning in practice. Whereas now experts see the term as referring to a practice that involves some form of police-community collaboration, the International Crisis Group – a non-governmental organisation working in conflict and other security situations to promote peace – reported that, in Indonesia, the government instead tasked local civilians with enforcing the law, as a means of covering for the lack of police resources.⁶⁰

This in turn led to extortion, the use of law enforcement for political aims, and violence targeted at minority communities, with limited or no accountability.⁶¹ While these practices are now less prevalent, the RAN CVE similarly gives members of the public a large role in P/CVE, ‘because the country’s police force wasn’t large enough to deal with security issues by itself’.⁶² It is difficult to see how this is anything but a reversion to the community-oriented policing Indonesia experienced in the 2000s that led to widespread human rights violations and societal division.⁶³

“ It is difficult to see how this is anything but a reversion to the community-oriented policing Indonesia experienced in the 2000s that led to widespread human rights violations and societal division. ”

⁵⁶Indonesian National Police, ‘Grand strategi Polri, 2005-2025: Surat keputusan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia’, Pol. SKEP/360/VI/2005, 10 June 2005. For a brief summary as to how community policing and ‘religious moderation’ are interlinked in Indonesia, see Ardianto Bayu Wibowo, Bambang Dwi Hartono and Suprpto, ‘Reinforcement of religious moderation through role of chaplain in community police partnership forum from management perspective’ (2021) 6(2) Attarbiyah: Journal of Islamic Culture and Education 145.

⁵⁷On military reform and its relationship with democracy, see Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002). On the reform and democratisation process generally, see Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Reform of Indonesian law in the post-Soeharto era (1998-1999)’, PhD thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, 2004; Paul J. Carnegie, ‘Democratization and Decentralization in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Understanding Transition Dynamics’ (2008-9) 81(4) Pacific Affairs 515.

⁵⁸Regulation of the National Police Chief Number 3 of 2015 concerning Community Policing. See also *Police Law Number 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police: Decree of the Chief of Police dated October 13, 2005 concerning Policies and Strategies for Implementing Community Policing Models in Carrying Out Police Tasks*, SKEP/737/X/2005; *Regulation of the National Police Chief Number 7 of 2008 concerning Basic Guidelines for the Strategy and Implementation of Community Policing in the Implementation of Police Duties*.

⁵⁹Regulation of the National Police Chief Number 4 of 2020 concerning Swakarsa Security. On the history of Pam Swakarsa in Indonesia, see The Jakarta Post, ‘Responsibility to protect’ (The Jakarta Post, 24 September 2020); C. (Kees) van Dijk, *A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001).

⁶⁰International Crisis Group, ‘The Perils of Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok’, ICG Asia Report No. 67, 7 November 2003.

⁶¹International Crisis Group, ‘The Perils of Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok’, ICG Asia Report No. 67, 7 November 2003.

⁶²Riza Chadajah, ‘Decree Giving Indonesian Citizens Role in Policing Extremism Criticized’, (Benar News, 25 January 2021).

⁶³The Star, ‘Muslim groups wary of Indonesia’s new terror prevention plan’ (The Star, 21 January 2021).

For instance, the RAN states as a strategic aim:

'[To i]ncrease the effectiveness of community policing in preventing Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism.'

In doing so, the government plans to generate:

'Increased understanding and skills of police and the community in efforts to prevent Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism[; and] 2. Increased public awareness on community policing as an effort to prevent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism.'⁶⁴

The RAN therefore indicates the government's intention to train community members in policing, risking a proliferation of religious discrimination, a matter we address below.

The government has also centralised the community policing approach in the RAN CVE, which essentially outsources monitoring and enforcement of the plan to local community and religious leaders, civil society organisations and many other local actors, whom the government plans to train on P/CVE.⁶⁵ In implementing the RAN, the BNPT and other actors have decided to become more involved with local communities.⁶⁶ While we do not address the efficacy and theoretical basis for P/CVE programmes here, we note that these programmes usually have a contested and otherwise weak methodology, often relying on an evidence base that is flimsy at best and an unproven assumption that a person who holds certain beliefs is necessarily more likely to engage in violence than other people are.⁶⁷ As well as the harmful effects discussed below, any training programme that relies on assumptions rather than high-quality research is likely to be arbitrary.

Here, we look at three distinct human rights concerns that arise from this practice: wrongful arrests, potentially unlawful killings and religious discrimination.

One problem arises from the lack of source verification when people report each other as 'extremists', and independent assessment of allegedly incriminating information – something which feeds into existing poor practice within some police and military institutions, and in turn leads to wrongful arrests. Further, Indonesian human rights groups allege that between 2013 and 2015 alone, Densus 88 were involved in at least 159 different unlawful incidents, with 180 arrests or detentions, 29 deaths and 16 injuries, while claiming that actual figures could be higher.⁶⁸ In 2016, Siyono – a terrorism suspect from Central Java – died as a result of injuries sustained in police custody following an initially unlawful arrest, which Densus 88 carried out without a warrant.⁶⁹

“ between 2013 and 2015 alone, Densus 88 were [allegedly] involved in at least 159 different unlawful incidents, with 180 arrests or detentions, 29 deaths and 16 injuries ”

In a report released by PP Muhammadiyah – an influential Muslim advocacy organisation – along with Komnas HAM (one of Indonesia's accredited national human rights institutions) based on the autopsy results, the organisations concluded that Siyono died due to a broken rib and chest injuries.

⁶⁴Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 40-41.

⁶⁵Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 17-21, 41, 63-64, 97-100.

⁶⁶Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, 'Pelibatan Masyarakat Unsur Penting Berantas Terorisme' (BNPT, 4 April 2022).

⁶⁷For an outline, see Cécile Rousseau, Ghayda Hassan and Youssef Oulhote, 'And if there were another way out? Questioning the prevalent radicalization models' (2017) 108(5-6) Canadian Journal of Public Health e633, p. e634. See also Kamaldeep Bhui, 'Flash, the emperor and policies without evidence: counter-terrorism measures destined for failure and societally divisive' (2016) 40 BJPsych Bulletin 82, in which the author argues: 'We need to know far more in order to separate beliefs that are benignly religious from those that include political motivations and incite violence but are disguised through religious rhetoric; without this knowledge clinicians would face an onerous and unscientific set of expectations. Regrettably, the current UK government's counter-terrorism responses, specifically the Prevent programme, have been criticised for begetting exactly this unintended consequence.' (at p. 83). See also Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, 'Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism' (2008) 20(3) Terrorism and Political Violence 415.

⁶⁸Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS) and Democracy Education Association (P2D), 'Indonesia: Submission for Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council (Third Cycle), 27th Session – Terrorism and Human Rights' (October 2016).

⁶⁹Riefky Rachman Fairuz and Toetik Rahayuningsih, 'Criminal Responsibility of the Member of Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) Related to the Negligence in Handling Suspected Terrorism which Cause Casualty' (2020) 17(4) PJAE 2548.

Despite allegations that Siyono was resisting arrest and fighting the officers making the arrest, the organisations concluded there were no signs of such resistance.⁷⁰ At the same time, individuals are both legally and practically unable to obtain redress from Densus 88 for any rights violations they have suffered, despite the long record of deaths in Densus 88 custody.⁷¹ Any rights-violating practices can therefore proliferate without accountability.

Wrongful arrests and extrajudicial killings occurring during operations appear to be systemic issues within the Indonesian police and military, particularly regarding the Densus 88 unit.⁷² P/CVE in Indonesia therefore relies on police, military and security agencies with a known history of violence and other problems.

Freedom of Religion

The reliance on community policing also causes human rights concerns when it comes to freedom of religion. In practice, police and their community partners often promote ‘religious moderation’, advising communities to follow ‘mainstream’ religious teachings, with the aim of altering people’s religious beliefs – ostensibly to improve community cohesion and generate ‘peace’.⁷³ (We discuss the concept of ‘moderation’ below.) For instance, in November 2018, Jakarta’s Attorney General’s Office launched Smart Pakem, an app that allows communities to report on groups that they believe deviate from the six religions that the state officially recognises.⁷⁴ Komnas HAM, Indonesia’s national human rights institution, criticised

the app for failing to uphold citizens’ constitutional rights, contributing to rising religious intolerance in the country, and causing social disintegration.

It seems likely that many communities feel pushed towards advancing religious ‘moderation’ as a result of government pronouncements, as well as the involvement of religious leaders in P/CVE. In general, the country suffers from a high level of religious intolerance,⁷⁶ which in turn causes religious leaders to report people who exhibit non-mainstream religious, political or indigenous beliefs, even if they have no involvement in defined terrorist causes.⁷⁷ In essence, the Indonesian government’s use of ‘religious moderation’ promotes religious intolerance among those holding more common views, even if the stated goal is to increase tolerance.⁷⁸ The government then advances these ‘religious tolerance’ or ‘religious moderation’ narratives through its P/CVE effort in a way that promotes popular support, while silencing people who hold non-mainstream views and are therefore more likely to be critical of government policies. This may create a ‘chilling effect’ on free expression and the free exercise of religion, with minority communities censoring themselves because they are aware that the government and their neighbours disapprove of their beliefs.⁷⁹

“ the Indonesian government’s use of ‘religious moderation’ promotes religious intolerance among those holding more common views, even if the stated goal is to increase tolerance. ”

⁷⁰For a summary of the case, see The Jakarta Post, ‘[Komnas HAM confronts police on Siyono’s death](#)’ (The Jakarta Post, 12 April 2016); Kompas, ‘[Komnas HAM Duga Densus 88 Langgar HAM Terkait Tewasnya Siyono](#)’ (Kompas.com, 12 April 2016); The Jakarta Post, ‘[Family of dead suspected terrorist reports Densus 88 for murder](#)’ (The Jakarta Post, 16 May 2016).

⁷¹Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), ‘[Potret Buram: Densus 88 Anti-Teror](#)’ (date unknown). Prior to Siyono’s death, 121 suspects reportedly died in Densus 88 custody following the group’s formation in 2004: see Tia Asmara, ‘[Indonesian Police: Man Who Died in Custody was a Militant Leader](#)’ (Benar News, 4 May 2016).

⁷²Tyler McBrien, ‘[Jakarta’s Counterproductive Counterterrorism Approach](#)’ (New Atlanticist, 12 September 2013); Elaine Pearson, ‘[Indonesia: Hold Abusers From Military Accountable](#)’ (Human Rights Watch, 24 January 2017); Natalie Sambhi, ‘[Generals gaining ground: Civil-military relations and democracy in Indonesia](#)’ (Brookings, 22 January 2021); Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge, ‘[The military’s role in Indonesia’s democracy, Misguided perception?](#)’ (International Institute for Asian Studies, 2019); Adi Renaldi, ‘[Indonesia’s Special Counter-Terrorism Squad Has an Accountability Problem](#)’ (VICE, 20 February 2018).

⁷³In the community policing context, see Ardianto Bayu Wibowo, Bambang Dwi Hartono and Suprpto, ‘[Reinforcement of religious moderation through role of chaplain in community police partnership forum from management perspective](#)’ (2021) 6(2) Attarbiyah: Journal of Islamic Culture and Education 145.

⁷⁴Office, gave this reasons for developing the app in response to human rights organisations’ critique: see Rivki, ‘[Kontroversi Aplikasi Pakem Kejaksaan](#)’ (Detik News, 28 November 2018). See also Zainal Abidin Bagir, ‘[Policing religion? There’s an app for that](#)’ (Indonesia at Melbourne, 17 December 2018).

⁷⁵Reported separately in Rakhmatulloh, ‘[Komnas HAM: Aplikasi Smart Paken Berpotensi Memecah Belah Masyarakat](#)’ (Sindo News, 29 November 2018); Sheith Khidhir, ‘[Mobile app to spy on thy neighbour?](#)’ (The ASEAN Post, 30 November 2018).

⁷⁶Greg Fealy, ‘The Politics of Religious Intolerance in Indonesia: Mainstream-ism Trumps Extremism?’, in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds.), [Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia](#) (London: Routledge, 2018); Human Rights Watch, ‘[In Religion’s Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia](#)’ (28 February 2013).

⁷⁷For instance, see Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, ‘[Pelibatan Masyarakat Unsur Penting Berantas Terorisme](#)’ (BNPT, 4 April 2022).

⁷⁸See Tahir Abbas and Imran Awan, ‘[Limits of UK Counterterrorism Policy, and its Implications for Islamophobia and Far Right Extremism](#)’ (2015) 4(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 16.

⁷⁹Stewart Fenwick, ‘Faith and Freedom in Indonesian Law: Liberal Pluralism, Religion and the Democratic State’, in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds.), [Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia](#) (London: Routledge, 2018).

To the extent that the Indonesian government fears certain strands of Islam, as demonstrated by the decision to monitor people's religious beliefs through 'community policing', it appears that the UK government shares this fear – due to both a biased association of Muslims with violence and, perhaps, a desire to avoid changes in the political or economic climate in Indonesia. The UK is no stranger to the use of informants and other forms of community-level infiltration of police into religious and activist groups, and in recent years, the government has persuaded Parliament to adopt legislation expanding its power to use confidential human informants to inform on peaceful activist groups despite widespread objections to this tactic.⁸⁰ Therefore, as Indonesia uses various forms of community-level surveillance to detect departures from what the government regards as acceptable political or religious views, the UK appears unlikely to object to such practices on human rights grounds – and may even view such techniques with approval.

We recall that the UK has a lengthy and ongoing track record of using community-level informants and covert efforts to influence public opinion in colonial and post-colonial contexts.⁸¹

In Indonesia, the UK secretly engaged in propaganda tactics in the 1960s that helped bring dictator Soeharto to power, as recently declassified documents show.⁸²

During the consultation process for this report, interviewees expressed a range of views regarding alleged discrimination on racial or religious grounds resulting from Indonesia's P/CVE approach.⁸³ (See the further discussion below on the specific situation in Papua/West Papua.) A common theme was the disjunction between human rights organisations and self-defined 'peace groups' in Indonesia regarding the negative consequences of P/CVE in the country as it relates specifically to freedom of religion. This debate centred around the effects of 'moderate Islam' or 'religious moderation' policies.⁸⁴

On one side of the debate, human rights organisations expressed concerns that particular Muslim communities – such as members of the Ahmadiyah, Shia and Gaftar groups – are disproportionately impacted by P/CVE in Indonesia. For instance, the aforementioned Smart Pakem app asks its users to report the 'deviant' teachings of these groups, while listing the names of their leaders and office addresses.⁸⁵



Indonesian Police
Photo by UNAMID via Flickr

⁸⁰See Reprieve, Privacy International, Pat Finucane Centre, Committee on the Administration of Justice and Rights & Security International, '[Briefing for Second Reading of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources \(Criminal Conduct\) Bill](#)' (October 2020). For details of the UK's practice, see the Guardian and Undercover Research Group, '[UK political groups spied on by undercover police](#)' (The Guardian, 13 February 2019).

⁸¹Kristine Eck, '[The origins of policing institutions: Legacies of colonial insurgency](#)', (2018) 55(2) Journal of Peace Research 147, pp. 150, 152.

⁸²Paul Lashmar, Nicholas Gilby and James Oliver, '[Slaughter in Indonesia: Britain's secret propaganda war](#)' (The Observer, 17 October 2021); Paul Lashmar, Nicholas Gilby and James Oliver, '[Revealed: how UK spies incited mass murder of Indonesia's communists](#)' (The Observer, 17 October 2021).

⁸³Further, see Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds.), [Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia](#) (London, Routledge: 2016); Stewart Fenwick, [Blasphemy, Islam and the State: Pluralism and Liberalism in Indonesia](#) (London, Routledge: 2017); Al Khanif, [Religious Minorities, Islam and the Law: International Human Rights and Islamic Law in Indonesia](#) (London, Routledge: 2021).

⁸⁴This phenomenon is not unique geographically or substantively to Indonesian P/CVE efforts: many other governments have formulated policies based on 'religious moderation', including in the UK, and in Indonesia this concept of 'moderate Islam' permeates society. On international uses of 'religious moderation' policies, see Bassam Abul A'la, Ripkin Ikhwandani and Sugito Muzaqi, '[Religious moderation concept in Israel, United Kingdom, and Indonesia: a systematic literature review](#)', International Conference on Islam, Law, and Society (INCOILS), Record of Conference Proceedings (2022); David Stevens, '[Reasons to be Fearful. One, Two, Three: The 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Agenda](#)' (2011) 13(2) The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 165. On religious moderation in Indonesia generally, see Yudhi Kawangung, '[Religious Moderation Discourse in Plurality of Social Harmony in Indonesia](#)' (2019) 3(1) International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 160; Khairan M. Arif, '[Concept and Implementation of Religious Moderation in Indonesia](#)' (2021) 12(1) Al-Risalah: Jurnal Studi Agama dan Pemikiran Islam 90; Achmad Anwar Abidin and Muhammad Ali Murtadlo, '[Curriculum development of multicultural-based Islamic education as an effort to weaver religious moderation values in Indonesia](#)' (2020) 2(1) International Journal of Islamic Education, Research and Multiculturalism 29; Hasse Jubba, Jaffary Awang and Siti Aisyah Sungkilyang, '[The Challenges of Islamic Organizations in Promoting Moderation in Indonesia](#)' (2021) 6(1) Jurnal Ilmiah Agama dan Sosial Budaya 43.

⁸⁵Andreas Harsono, '[Indonesia Launches 'Snitch' App Targeting Religious Minorities](#)' (Human Rights Watch, 30 November 2018).

Commentators have argued that the centralisation of Pancasila – that is, the process of ensuring that law and policy complies with Pancasila, while providing public education on the doctrine, which excludes non-mainstream religions from official recognition – has emboldened some religious leaders to issue fatwa (religious pronouncements) calling for the abolition of ‘deviant’ religions or ‘sects’. The Indonesian government has supported such fatwa, even going so far as to arrest ‘devious’ religious leaders under the Blasphemy Law.⁸⁶ This law criminalises any act which is deemed insulting to one of Pancasila’s six recognised religions.⁸⁷ Criminal prosecutions under the law have spiked over the past few years.⁸⁸

These laws and practices raise questions about how the Indonesian government complies with its obligations to protect the freedom of religion or belief under international law (set out above), not only under the RAN CVE, but as part of its national security strategy more broadly.

The right to hold a belief is absolute, and states are entitled to limit the right to express or otherwise demonstrate a belief in only a narrow range of circumstances: when the limitation is ‘prescribed by law’ and is ‘necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.⁸⁹ The UN Human Rights Committee – the body responsible for hearing an individual complaints of alleged violations of the ICCPR – interprets this limitation narrowly.⁹⁰

The Indonesian government’s use of P/CVE appears to be an attempt to force people to change their religious or political views, undermining both the right to hold a belief and the right to manifest it. The targets of the government’s interventions include large groups of people who neither advocate for nor engage in hate speech – a form of speech that states may permissibly restrict under international law. Rather, the Indonesian government’s approach is much broader, since the government aims to surveil and punish

“the government aims to surveil and punish people who express or hold beliefs other than the ones it defines as ‘mainstream’. This means its approach is illegal under international law.”

people who express or hold beliefs other than the ones it defines as ‘mainstream’. This means its approach is illegal under international law.

Additionally, while Indonesia’s justification for imposing a repressive P/CVE strategy may superficially appear to have the goal of protecting national security, it does not require much digging to see that its real purpose is apparently to create ‘social cohesion’ – that is, prevent dissent by silencing the people who are most likely to disagree with government policy. The practice of abolishing certain religious organisations may also violate the freedoms of assembly and association.⁹¹

In contrast to the human rights organisations interviewed for this report, Indonesian peace groups and others who do not accept the view that some Muslim communities face discrimination as a result of counter-terrorism measures instead allege that these complaints are political, lacking in substance. For instance, some of the respondents we consulted argued that critics disingenuously make allegations of discrimination in these contexts in order to achieve regime change. Some peace groups have also alleged that people who express concerns about discrimination often support ‘extremist’ ideologies and retain close connections with designated terrorist groups, or themselves hold discriminatory views about other religions.⁹²

⁸⁶Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker, ‘Introduction: Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia’, in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds.), *Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia* (London, Routledge: 2016), pp. 2-7.

⁸⁷Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1965 on the prevention of blasphemy and the abuse of religions. Article 5 inserts Article 156(a) into the Criminal Code.

⁸⁸See Andreas Harsono, ‘Yet another Victim of Indonesia’s Blasphemy Law’ (Human Rights Watch, 12 August 2022); Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt, ‘State Power to Restrict Religious Freedom: An Overview of the Legal Framework’, in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds.), *Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia* (London, Routledge: 2016), pp. 24-26.

⁸⁹ICCPR, Article 18(3).

⁹⁰See, e.g. Comm. No. 3153/2018, *Mursalov et al v. Azerbaijan*, 13 January 2023, CCPR/C/136/D/3153/2018, paras. 9.2-9.3.

⁹¹See Comm. No. 2483/2014, *Adyrkhayev, Solikov and the Religious Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Dushanbe v. Tajikistan*, 25 November 2022, CCPR/C/135/D/2483/2014, paras. 9.1-9.9.

⁹²See Idhamsyah Eka Putra, Wolfgang Wagner, Peter Holtz and Any Rufaedah, ‘Accounting for a Riot: Religious Identity, Denying One’s Prejudice, and the Tool of Blasphemy’, (2021) 9(1) *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 69, pp. 70-71, 73, 80-81; Idhamsyah Eka Putra and Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Prejudice in interreligious context: the role of metaprejudice and majority-minority status’ (2017) 27(3) *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 226. These claims may stem from a reliance on selective examples: see Associated Press, ‘Indonesia jails activist lawyer over Islamic radicalism’ (Associated Press, 7 April 2022).

These criticisms may reflect a view, espoused by some governments and explained by Al Khanif, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Jember, that ‘non-mainstream religions... are the main source of public unrest and should be eliminated, adjusted or transformed into the majority version’.⁹³ In Indonesia, this focus on changing people’s religious views leads to a prioritisation of ‘moderate Islam’, meaning that the government formulates policies that focus on moving people away from holding Islamic views it does not like, with a view to the population following what it deems to be ‘moderate’ religious views instead.⁹⁴

In implementing the RAN, the government seeks to infiltrate religious communities with a view to changing their religious views so that they align with what the government regards as more ‘mainstream’ conceptions of Islam. The RAN CVE is just one strand of the Indonesian government’s strategy to promote such ‘religious moderation’, but it contributes significantly to an environment limiting the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion; the freedom of expression; and other human rights – potentially in a discriminatory manner. The RAN CVE contributes to a situation in which the government facilitates the free expression of people it believes hold ‘mainstream’ beliefs, while silencing those who are most likely to disagree with its policies. People who face such government repression may also be shunned by their own communities, due to the government-backed forms of exclusion that Indonesia’s P/CVE policies engender at the local level.



Papua/West Papua

Papua is a region in eastern Indonesia that borders Papua New Guinea and holds special autonomous status within the country. The region was not originally part of the new Indonesian state when the latter attained independence in 1945, but instead was retained by the Dutch colonial powers to become what was then Dutch New Guinea. Following the signing of the New York Agreement in 1962, the region was de facto ceded to Indonesia.⁹⁵ As the majority of people in Papua are descendants of – or remain – the indigenous Papuan population, there have been many calls for its independence since the 1962 agreement.⁹⁶ There is a long history of severe human rights violations in the region, with some academics and researchers defining the treatment of the indigenous Papuan population as a genocide or amounting to crimes against humanity.⁹⁷ The securitised treatment of the Papuan people – many of whom identify as Black⁹⁸ – continues to this day, with frequent allegations of unlawful killings, enforced disappearances and torture perpetrated by both private and public security services, and with the Indonesian government allegedly targeting indigenous and environmental rights campaigners in order to protect the multinational extraction companies that operate there.⁹⁹

The securitised treatment of the Papuan people – many of whom identify as Black – continues to this day, with frequent allegations of unlawful killings, enforced disappearances and torture

⁹³Khanif further states that ‘[i]f the minority resists against the majority perspective of commonality, then the majority defines them as abnormal or deviant. In the context of religious freedom, the word “deviant” derives from the consent of the religious majority to preserve religious orthodoxy. These findings confirm that, in general, there is inequality between religious minorities and the majority’: Al Khanif, *Religious Minorities, Islam and the Law: International Human Rights and Islamic Law in Indonesia* (London, Routledge: 2021), p. 109.

⁹⁴For further explanation, see Chris Chaplin, ‘*Governing Interreligious Relations and Politicising “Moderation”: Navigating between Government and Grassroots Interfaith Initiatives in Contemporary Indonesia*’ (Observatoire International du Religieux, July 2023); Zainal Abidin Bagir and Husni Mubarak, ‘*Religious freedom, harmony or moderation? Government attempts to manage diversity*’ (Indonesia at Melbourne, 30 November 2021).

⁹⁵*Agreement concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)*, New York, 15 August 1962, entered into force 21 September 1962, 437 UNTS 273. We use de facto here as, although in theory the population had the chance to vote whether to become part of Indonesia, this in practice was not effected – people were forced to vote yes, see: Bilveer Singh, *Papua: Geopolitics and the Quest for Nationhood* (London: Routledge, 2008).

⁹⁶For a history of the region, see Emma Kluge, ‘*West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961-69*’ (2020) 42(6) *The International History Review* 1155; Nino Viartasiwi, ‘*The politics of history in West Papua – Indonesia conflict*’ (2018) 26(1) *Asian Journal of Political Science* 141; Dale Gietzelt, ‘*The Indonesianization of West Papua*’ (1989) 59(3) *Oceania* 201; Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People* (3rd edn, Guildford: TAPOL, 1988).

⁹⁷Asian Human Rights Commission, *The Neglected Genocide: Human rights abuses against Papuans in the Central Highlands, 1977-1978* (Hong Kong: Clear-Cut Publishing and Printing Co., 2013); Elizabeth Brundige, Winter King, Priyeha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck and Xiang Yuan, ‘*Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*’ (Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, April 2004); Pizaro Gozali Idrus, ‘*Indonesia’s anti-rebel raids in Papua could be crimes against humanity: rights group*’ (BenarNews, 17 August 2023).

⁹⁸Many indigenous Papuans took part in the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement in 2020: Amy Gunia, ‘*A Racial Justice Campaign Brought New Attention to Indonesia’s Poorest Region. Will It Translate to Support for Independence?*’ (TIME, 15 December 2020).

⁹⁹Global Witness, ‘*Trading Risks: How ADM & Bunge are failing Land & Environmental Defenders in Indonesia*’ (December 2020). See, also, the other sources cited in

Following the Indonesian government's decision to change the boundaries of the country's Papuan provinces in June 2022, there are now six distinct administrative areas in the Papuan region, a matter that led to significant protests across Papua (see below). For this reason, the names Papua and West Papua have been altered on many occasions since the turn of the century; the region was officially named Papua in 2002. While we refer to both Papua and West Papua in this section interchangeably, our analysis is intended to cover the entire Papua region of Indonesia.

The Indonesian government has designated several Papuan organisations as 'terrorist' groups under domestic law. However, in some instances, commentators such as Amnesty International have argued that the government is using these designations for political reasons – specifically, to prevent individuals and groups from advocating for independence from Indonesia.¹⁰⁰ These designations could, therefore, be viewed as an extension of the Indonesian government's approach to religious minorities, in the sense that they use counter-terrorism approaches to silence the people who are most likely to critique government policy. Some of the individuals and groups interviewed for this report supported the government's focus – in line with the divergence in views around 'religious moderation' policies, described above – and spoke about how they perceived religious minorities and Papuan independence groups as wanting to 'overthrow' the government. Therefore, the government can bolster its support among the rest of the population by focusing its counter-terrorism and P/CVE architecture on Papuans as well as religious dissenters or religious minorities.¹⁰¹

For instance, in April 2021, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin (commonly referred to as Mahfud MD), declared West Papua's armed resistance movement, the National Liberation Army for West

Papua (TPNPB, Tentara Nasional Pembebasan Papua Barat), a 'terrorist' organisation, with the support of the BNPT. (The entity is also known as TPNPB-OPM or simply OPM, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, the Free Papua Organisation.) Announcing the move during a press conference, Mahfud MD stated that 'organizations and people in Papua who commit mass violence are categorized as terrorists,' without mentioning the OPM by name. However, in official BNPT documents, the agency specifically referred to its plan to designate the OPM as a terrorist organisation.¹⁰²

The move was purportedly prompted by the TPNPB's killing of the head of the Indonesia National intelligence Agency's (BIN, Badan Intelijen Nasional's) Papua branch, Brigadier General I Gusti Putu Danny Nugraha Karya (commonly referred to as Putu IGP Dani NKI) in April 2021.¹⁰³ However, some politicians had been advocating for the government to make such a declaration for over two and a half years, since TPNPB attacks in December 2018 that killed 18 road workers in Nduga.¹⁰⁴

In the days after the Nduga attack, some politicians in the parliament's lower house, the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), declared that an anti-terrorism 'adjustment' was necessary which would shift the policing operation in West Papua towards a military one.¹⁰⁵ The debate continued in the days after a joint military-police operation began in December 2018, displacing tens of thousands of civilians and leading to the deaths of 243 people over two months.¹⁰⁶

The recent shift to arresting OPM members under counter-terrorism laws has also expanded the available resources for Indonesian security forces in West Papua. For instance, in May 2021, an additional 500 Koopssus TNI and Densus 88 personnel were deployed to 'wipe out' OPM. The Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, General Andika Perkasa, also announced the construction of an additional two outposts with the aim of pursuing the 'Armed Criminal Group.'

¹⁰⁰Usman Hamid, 'Terrorist' designation shows govt's failure to address root of Papua's problems' (Amnesty International, 30 April 2021); Kate Lamb, 'Indonesia designates Papuan separatists 'terrorists'' (Reuters, 29 April 2021).

¹⁰¹Some commentators argue that this is a natural consequence of P/CVE policies: see Brennan Center for Justice, 'Why Countering Violent Extremism Programs Are Bad Policy' (Brennan Center for Justice, 9 September 2019).

¹⁰²Usman Hamid, 'Terrorist' designation shows govt's failure to address root of Papua's problems' (Amnesty International, 30 April 2021).

¹⁰³Ronggo Astungkoro, 'Papua Intelligence Chief killed by Papuan separatist group' (Republika, 26 April 2021).

¹⁰⁴Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorisme, 'Polda Papua Berharap Bukungan BNPT Guna Ciptakan Kondisi Papua Yang Damai Dan Tentram' (BNPT, 24 May 2021).

¹⁰⁵Kompas, 'DPR Usul Pemerintah Terapkan Operasi Militer Selain Perang di Papua' (Kompas.com, 13 December 2018).

¹⁰⁶See Fahmi Alfansi P. Pane, 'Medefinisikan OPM dan KKB' (Republika, 6 December 2018).

¹⁰⁷Tom Allard, 'EXCLUSIVE: Indonesia's troop surge in Papua aims to 'wipe out' armed rebels: police intel chief' (Reuters, 21 May 2021).

¹⁰⁸West Papua Daily News, 'Hunt Down KKB Papua General Andika Sends 400 Special Rider and Build 2 New Post' (West Papua Daily News, 17 March 2022).

Regardless of the contested legitimacy of ‘anti-separatism’ laws and terrorism designations – separatism is classed as treason and is a criminal offence under Indonesian law – it is evident that the police and military’s counter-terrorism approach in West Papua has resulted in a number of serious human rights violations.¹⁰⁹ These include alleged killings, torture and ill-treatment.¹¹⁰ Dozens of indigenous Papuans have also been arrested and charged with offences carrying lengthy prison terms, principally under the heading of ‘treason’.¹¹¹

Between August and September 2019, the region experienced mass demonstrations triggered by the racist mistreatment of West Papuan students in the Indonesian cities of Malang and Surabaya. The incidents in Surabaya involved Indonesian soldiers reportedly shouting ‘monkey’ at West Papuan students.¹¹² The demonstrations, which swept across 22 towns in West Papua as well as 17 other cities in Indonesia, were largely concerned with condemning racism and prosecuting the perpetrators in Java.¹¹³ The government deployed least 6,500 police and military personnel to stop the protests, resulting in civilian deaths. The civilian death toll during this period reached around 60 people (media reports conflict on the number of actual deaths), of whom 35 were indigenous West Papuans. Of those 35 indigenous people who died, 30 had sustained bullet wounds, suggesting that they were killed by the Indonesian security forces. Five other deaths were from stab wounds allegedly inflicted by militia groups. Another 287 civilians were injured as a result of violence during the uprising, while some commentators suspect that the actual number of deaths and injuries was higher, as many victims may have avoided going to the hospitals for fear of reprisals.¹¹⁴

More recently, the House of Representatives passed a set of laws on 30 June 2022 to establish three new provinces out of what was previously the province of Papua: South Papua, Central Papua and the Papua Highlands. The government claimed that the decision would help spur the development of one of the country’s poorest regions.¹¹⁶ However, critics fear that the proliferation of administrative districts has a direct impact on existing identities and identity-based organising among the Indigenous Papuans (OAP), who are divided into various tribes, speak different languages, and live in various customary and ancestral lands.¹¹⁷ These new laws build on legal developments throughout the late 2010s and early 2020s that further reduced the role of indigenous Papuan representative bodies in local, regional and national governance.¹¹⁸ The plan therefore sparked protests, to which the authorities responded with arrests and force, including a reported incident of police holding a gun against a student’s head during a protest in Abepura.¹¹⁹

There appears to be a de facto prohibition on protests in West Papua, as illustrated in some of the examples already discussed.¹²⁰ In November 2022, for instance, police forcibly broke up a vigil at Jayapura University of Technology and Science to commemorate the twenty-first anniversary of the abduction and killing of pro-independence leader Theys Eluay.



¹⁰⁹On separatism as a criminal offence, see Reuters, [‘Indonesian police ban violent protests, separatism in Papua’](#) (Reuters, 2 September 2019); Fahmi Alfansi P. Pane, [‘Medefinisikan OPM dan KKB’](#) (Republika, 6 December 2018).

¹¹⁰Ryan Dagur, [‘Claims of torture following Papua protest’](#) (UCA News, 14 May 2013); Amnesty International, [‘Fear of torture for those detained in Papua violence’](#) (Amnesty International, 10 October 2000); Asian Human Rights Commission, [‘INDONESIA: Peaceful protestors arrested and tortured by police in Papua’](#) (Asian Human Rights Commission, 22 April 2014); Febriana Firdaus, [‘West Papuan protestors killed by Indonesian police: Witnesses’](#) (Al Jazeera, 28 August 2019).

¹¹¹See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, [‘Indonesia Arrests Yet More Indigenous Papuans’](#) (Human Rights Watch, 5 December 2019).

¹¹²Ben Doherty, [‘Why are there violent clashes in Papua and West Papua’](#) (The Guardian, 22 August 2019); John Martinkus, [‘How one word brought Indonesia’s rule in West Papua to boiling point’](#) (The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2020); Liselotte Mas, [‘Papuans turn monkey slur into a revolutionary symbol’](#) (France 24, 23 August 2019).

¹¹³John Martinkus, [‘How one word brought Indonesia’s rule in West Papua to boiling point’](#) (The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2020).

¹¹⁴The UK-based charity TAPOL reports 61 deaths: see TAPOL, [‘The 2019 West Papua Uprising in Summary’](#) (TAPOL, 19 August 2020). The International Coalition for Papua, a coalition of church groups and civil society organisations in the region, settles on a total 59 deaths: see Johnny Blades, [‘Death toll from Papua 2019 protest month put at 59’](#) (RNZ, 6 March 2020). See also Brad Adams, [‘Indonesia: Investigate Riot Death in Papua’](#) (Human Rights Watch, 7 October 2019).

¹¹⁵Nur Janti, [‘Laws forming new Papuan provinces trigger protests’](#) (The Jakarta Post, 1 July 2022).

¹¹⁶Reuters, [‘Indonesia passes new contentious law to create more provinces in Papua’](#) (Reuters, 1 July 2022).

¹¹⁷Made Supriatma, [‘The Second Amendment to Papua’s Special Autonomy Law and the Recentralization of Power to Jakarta’](#), Yusof Ishak Institute, Issue 2021, No. 123, 21 September 2021.

¹¹⁸Second Amendment to Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua.

¹¹⁹Konradus Epa, [‘Protests grow over Indonesia’s plan to carve up Papua’](#) (UCA News, 11 March 2022); Usman Hamid, [‘Repeated excessive use of force against peaceful protests show disregard for Papuan voices’](#) (Amnesty International, 4 June 2022).

¹²⁰Generally, see Helen Davidson, [‘New chapter of persecution: Indonesia cracks down on West Papua separatists’](#) (The Guardian, 8 January 2019); Phil Robertson, [‘Indonesia: Free Imprisoned Papua Activists’](#) (Human Rights Watch, 15 August 2022).

According to reports, police fired tear gas to disperse students who had raised the Morning Star flag – a symbol of Papuan independence. Fifteen people were arrested, three of whom were subsequently charged with treason and six with offences relating to violence against police officers. The three students charged with treason remained in detention at year’s end, while the others were released on bail.¹²¹ Although a former police officer has been investigated for suspected crimes committed during the event, civil society organisations have repeatedly – as with other forms of police and military accountability in the country – expressed concerns about the integrity and the transparency of the process.¹²²

The human rights violations and potential violations outlined in this section demonstrate a securitisation of indigenous and environmental rights movements, placing them in the category of people that the Indonesian government claims want to ‘overthrow’ it. We see this as an extension of the way that the government approaches so-called ‘deviant’ religious organisations, ensuring that it can silence those that are most likely to challenge its policies. Similarly, the approaches of the government, police and military to protests, including the indigenous and environmental rights protests outlined in this section, further demonstrate that these entities see any form of serious political disagreement as a security threat worthy of counter-terrorism or counter-extremism action.¹²³

¹²¹Asia Pacific Report, [‘Indonesian protestors call for release of West Papua Morning Star detainees’](#) (Asia Pacific Report, 6 December 2022); Victor Mambor, [‘Over 100 detained for allegedly raising Morning Star flag’](#) (The Jakarta Post, 6 December 2019). See also Marni Cordell, [‘West Papuans face long, jail terms for raising banned morning star flag’](#) (The Guardian, 23 January 2014).

¹²²Amnesty International, [‘Indonesia: No progress by police investigation into killing of peaceful Papuan protestor’](#) (Amnesty International, 10 August 2009).

¹²³On the response to other protests, see BBC News, [‘Indonesia: Thousands protest against ‘omnibus law’ on jobs’](#) (BBC News, 8 October 2020); Peoples Dispatch, [‘Thousands hit the streets against re-introduction of omnibus law in Indonesia’](#) (Peoples Dispatch, 17 June 2022).

Part Two: The UK's Role

'[W]e are well on our way to becoming the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific. I am here to make it clear that the Indo-Pacific Tilt is here to stay. It is permanent. We have gone from strategy to delivery. From economic theory to signing trade deals. From security discussions to deploying our Carrier Strike Group.'

James Cleverly, then-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (speech at the Milken Institute Asia Summit, Singapore, 29 September 2022)¹²⁴

Based on our research, we conclude that the UK government's support for rights-violating P/CVE in Indonesia is clear and direct.

In this part of the report, we outline the UK's overt support for and influence on the creation of Indonesia's RAN CVE, funding of harmful P/CVE programmes in Indonesia and training of military and police bodies that go on to commit serious harms, such as allegedly unlawful killings.

We also conclude that the UK is deliberately exporting its problematic counter-extremism strategy to countries such as Indonesia in an effort to gain political influence and trade connections globally following Brexit (the UK's departure from the European Union in 2020).

Regarding Indonesia specifically, the UK government wants to enhance its regional influence over the Indo-Pacific region – summarised by the government's 'tilt towards the Indo-Pacific', which it announced in 2021. Currently in third place in terms of regional influence on security approaches, behind the United States and Australia, the UK government wishes to strengthen its role while also warding off the growing threat it sees from the People's Republic of China.

Government documents call for increased military and other support, including through the means outlined in this report, as part of this 'tilt', with P/CVE support becoming one manifestation of this strategy.¹²⁵

Our research indicates that the UK knows or should know that the countries to which it is exporting P/CVE, or providing other P/CVE support, are using that P/CVE assistance as a way of silencing people who critique government policy. We know that at minimum, the UK is aware of the oppressive use of P/CVE in the Papua/West Papua region of Indonesia. However, the government has been disregarding these human rights concerns.

Finally, we conclude that the UK government's P/CVE strategy – internationally, as at home – is underpinned by a fundamental fear of Islam.

The UK recognises that Prevent-like P/CVE policies are an easy sell in countries such as Indonesia, which has a large Muslim population but officially secular stance; the government has been able to use Indonesia's stated goal of promoting 'religious tolerance' as a cover for ignoring human rights violations. At the same time, the UK appears to view the spread of increasingly 'extremist Islamist ideology' towards Europe as a threat, and to fear that instability in Indonesia could somehow lead to violence or instability in Britain, even though few people from Indonesia or with family connections there live in the UK and there appears to be no evidence-based reason for believing that political or other changes in Indonesia would threaten public safety in the UK.

What is the Prevent Strategy

The UK's official strategy for addressing potential 'extremism' is called Prevent, and it forms part of a larger counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST.

¹²⁴Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and James Cleverly, 'Indo-Pacific tilt: Foreign Secretary's speech, September 2022' (Gov.uk, 29 September 2022).

¹²⁵P/CVE is not explicitly mentioned in the UK government's statements explaining its 'Indo-Pacific tilt', but international P/CVE remains a strategic priority (as discussed elsewhere in this section). For an indication of the role of CT and P/CVE in the 'tilt', see David B. Roberts and Sara Gazi Almahri, 'The UK's Integrated Review and the Gulf States', in Joe Devanny and John Gearson (eds.), *The Integrated Review In Context: A Strategy Fit for the 2020s?* (London: King's College London, 2021), pp. 79-80.

Through Prevent, the national government requires public bodies – including schools and other education providers, local authorities, hospital trusts and other medical practitioners – to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ when fulfilling their functions.¹²⁶

Although Prevent ostensibly is not a policing programme, the government relies heavily on the police to implement the strategy, including by storing people’s personal data on police databases.¹²⁷

The UK’s interpretation of ‘extremism’ is broad and vague, and premised on the idea of opposition to what the government has labelled ‘fundamental British values’. For the UK government, such ‘fundamental British values’ include ‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.’¹²⁸ Academics and civil society groups have expressed concerns about the breadth of these concepts as well as the strategy’s lack of a basis in evidence, including the government’s seeming failure to rely on scientific opinion about why people engage in acts of violence; the government appears to assume that people who hold certain opinions are more likely to engage in acts of violence, and that the greatest risk of violence comes from people who hold those opinions, but it has not cited much evidence in support of this stance.¹²⁹

In England, Wales and Scotland (but not Northern Ireland), the government has imposed a legal duty on public-sector bodies to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.’¹³⁰ This duty requires public bodies to refer people they believe may be at risk of being drawn into terrorism to the ‘Channel’ process. The Channel process involves a multi-agency panel considering this risk in a case before it, before then deciding whether the individual requires further intervention to reduce the perceived risk – and, if so, what further action is required.¹³¹ The police are involved at all stages of this process.

Neither a Prevent referral nor subsequent Channel intervention needs to be based on any evidence of a crime, but they necessarily result in police involvement and the creation of records about people in police databases.¹³² In other words, Channel is a policing activity even though the government typically portrays it as not being part of the criminal justice system.

“ In other words, Channel is a policing activity even though the government typically portrays it as not being part of the criminal justice system. ”

The Channel process can lead to many different outcomes. Firstly, the case may not even reach a Channel panel, if a Channel case officer decides that the person’s case requires ‘no further action’.¹³³ Secondly, the case officer may decide that the case is suitable for signposting to other services, such as health and social care providers, and not requiring Channel intervention. In 2022-2023, only 16 percent of Prevent referrals were discussed at a Channel panel, the third possible outcome of the Channel process.¹³⁴ After reviewing the individual’s case, the Channel panel will decide whether to adopt it as a ‘Channel case’, meaning that it will subject the individual to more targeted measures by the authorities. In 2022-2023, a majority of cases that a Channel panel decided to discuss were then adopted as Channel cases.

If a panel decides to adopt a Channel case, then it will continuously assess the risk level and what kind of intervention it believes is needed. When the Channel panel decides it is no longer necessary for it to maintain oversight of a case, it can either discharge the individual as requiring no further action, or it can signpost the individual to other services.

¹²⁶This obligation is found in [Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015](#), s26. See Schedule 6 for the list of ‘specified authorities’ subject to the duty.

¹²⁷See Rights & Security International, [‘Secret, Confused and Illegal: How the UK Handles Personal Data Under Prevent’](#) (2022), paras. 26-40.

¹²⁸HM Government, [‘Prevent Strategy’](#), Cm 8092 (June 2011), p. 107.

¹²⁹See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, [‘Human rights impact of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism’](#), Human Rights Council, Forty-third session, 24 February-10 March 2020, A/HRC/43/46.

¹³⁰[Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015](#), s26. See Schedule 6 for the list of ‘specified authorities’ subject to the duty.

¹³¹For more information on the Channel process, see HM Government, [‘Channel duty guidance: Protecting people susceptible to radicalisation’](#) (2023).

¹³²For a summary, see Jamie Grierson, [‘Counter-terror police running secret Prevent database’](#) (The Guardian, 6 October 2019).

¹³³UK government guidance explains that this category of case includes ‘individuals already receiving support through Prevent, those presenting a higher risk than can be managed by Prevent, and those who were found to have no susceptibility at initial assessment.’ See Home Office, [‘Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2022 to March 2023’](#) (14 December 2023).

¹³⁴Home Office, [‘Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2022 to March 2023’](#) (14 December 2023).

But regardless of the outcome of the Channel process, the police and public authorities usually retain information about the referral and the referred individual.¹³⁵

Since the then-Labour government launched the Prevent strategy in 2007, academics and civil society organisations (including RSI) have criticised officials for allegedly using Prevent to, among other things, surveil Muslim communities and inhibit them from engaging in democratic debate.¹³⁶ When the government introduced the strategy in 2007, the authorities expressly intended to target only Muslims – creating a real fear of discriminatory treatment. Subsequently, despite the broadening of the strategy’s focus to include people with other religious and non-religious views, the concerns about its disproportionate impacts on Muslim communities have remained.

RSI and others have concluded that Prevent also impacts individual activists and civil society groups by preventing them from engaging in lawful, democratic debate. This conclusion forms part of a broader concern about how Prevent limits freedom of expression for people who do not advocate for violence, including people who do the opposite, calling for peace.¹³⁷

In 2019, partly as a result of such human rights concerns about Prevent, Parliament ordered the UK government to launch an independent review of the strategy.¹³⁸

However, rather than creating a review of the strategy’s human rights impacts, the government drafted narrow terms of reference, instead focusing on Prevent’s ‘effectiveness’.¹³⁹

In February 2023, the Independent Review of Prevent was released, alongside the government’s immediate acceptance of 34 recommendations by reviewer William Shawcross’, an individual with a history of controversial comments about the role of Islam in UK society.¹⁴⁰ When published, the review called for a ‘rebalancing’ of Prevent, to include a heavier focus on ‘Islamist extremism’, and an expansion of the range of people who should be referred, including those whose views do not promote violence. The review was dismissive of concerns that the authorities are disproportionately targeting Muslim communities in the UK, despite the longstanding and consistent nature of those concerns.¹⁴¹

There are many parallels between the Indonesian and UK governments’ approaches. First, both strategies appear to rely more on policy considerations than evidence. While both governments explicitly or implicitly argue that there is a direct causal link between someone who holds ‘extreme’ beliefs (as defined by the government) and the commission of acts of violence, their writings in support of that argument do not tend to rely on peer-reviewed research, or on a wide range of sources. Meanwhile, academic experts have critiqued these approaches for, among other issues, taking what they describe as an oversimplified approach to understanding why people engage in acts of violence.¹⁴²

Additionally, both governments rely on communities, or on local institutions that are part of the social fabric, such as schools, to surveil and report on their neighbours or people in their care.

¹³⁵See Rights & Security International, ‘[Secret, Confused and Illegal: How the UK Handles Personal Data Under Prevent](#)’ (2022), paras. 26-61.

¹³⁶For an evaluation of Prevent’s first ten years, see Paul Thomas, ‘[Changing experiences of responsabilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience](#)’ (2017) 45(3) Policy and Politics 305. For an overview of harms on Muslim communities, see Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick, ‘[The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities](#)’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011). On Islamophobia in Prevent, see Fahid Qurashi, ‘[The Prevent strategy and the UK ‘war on terror’: embedding infrastructures of surveillance in Muslim communities](#)’ (2018) 4(17) Palgrave Communications.

¹³⁷See Zin Derfoufi and Rights & Security International, ‘[Prevent-ing Dissent: How the U.K.’s counterterrorism strategy is eroding democracy](#)’ (2022); Rob Faure Walker, [The Emergence of ‘Extremism’](#) (London: Bloomsbury, 2022), pp. 160-185; Amnesty International, ‘[This is the Thought Police: The Prevent duty and its chilling effect on human rights](#)’ (Amnesty International, November 2023).

¹³⁸[Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019](#), s20(8).

¹³⁹Home Office, ‘[Independent Review of Prevent: Terms of Reference](#)’ (Gov.uk, 16 September 2019, updated 22 March 2021).

¹⁴⁰William Shawcross, ‘[Independent Review of Prevent](#)’, HC 1072, February 2023; HM Government, ‘[The Response to the Independent Review of Prevent](#)’, HC 1073, February 2023. Shawcross received a knighthood shortly after finishing his role as Independent Reviewer. On his comments about Islam, see Jamie Grierson and Vikram Todd, ‘[William Shawcross’s selection for Prevent role strongly criticised](#)’ (The Guardian, 26 January 2021). See also Simon Hooper, ‘[Prevent review: Home Office advisor compared Islamophobia to ‘blasphemy law’](#)’ (Middle East Eye, 9 February 2023).

¹⁴¹See Rights & Security International, ‘[Independent Review of Prevent Dismisses Expertise, Minimises Misogynist Violence and Ignores Risks of Bias in Counter-Terrorism Strategy](#)’ (Rights & Security International, 9 February 2023); John Holmwood and Layla Aitlhadj, ‘[A Response to the Shawcross Report](#)’ (The People’s Review of Prevent, March 2023).

¹⁴²For an outline, see Cécile Rousseau, Ghayda Hassan and Youssef Oulhote, ‘[And if there were another way out? Questioning the prevalent radicalization models](#)’ (2017) 108(5-6) Canadian Journal of Public Health e633, p. e634. See also Kamaldeep Bhui, ‘[Flash, the emperor and policies without evidence: counter-terrorism measures destined for failure and societally divisive](#)’ (2016) 40 BJPpsych Bulletin 82; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, ‘[Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism](#)’ (2008) 20(3) Terrorism and Political Violence 415.

This approach creates additional harms, particularly when the government decides which communities it trusts to conduct the surveillance, and which ones are the ‘suspect communities’.¹⁴³

Third, both governments rely on ideas of ‘religious moderation’ or ‘religious tolerance’, through which the government chooses what it regards as a ‘moderate’ belief, designating anyone outside of that ‘moderate’ window as holding ‘extreme’ beliefs and therefore requiring state intervention. In the UK, the government has created a list of what it describes as ‘fundamental British values’, and has positioned these centrally within the Prevent strategy as bases for evaluating whether someone is an ‘extremist’. (The extent to which the UK government, civil service, courts and other institutions exhibit these values in practice has not been part of the government’s analysis.) In Indonesia, the government uses the Pancasila doctrine to define the ‘moderate’ window.¹⁴⁴

Both governments use these concepts as a means of gaining popular support for their policies, while failing to demonstrate that these P/CVE approaches are necessary to preventing actual violence.

The similarities between the UK’s Prevent strategy and Indonesia’s RAN/CVE are not coincidental. Below, we describe the impact the UK has had on Indonesia’s practices.



EXPORTING PREVENT

- The Indonesian and UK governments have increased their co-operation post-Brexit. At the same time, the UK government aims to ‘export’ its counter-extremism strategy, Prevent, to other jurisdictions.
- Members of the committee charged with reforming Indonesia’s P/CVE strategy told us that they had copies of the UK’s Prevent strategy alongside them when formulating the RAN CVE.
- The UK government also provides official development assistance to the Indonesian government and some Indonesian civil society organisations in order to ‘export’ Prevent. In doing so, it helps perpetuate programmes in Indonesia that raise human rights concerns and are aimed at ‘religious moderation’, community-policing-based P/CVE, and the use of P/CVE in schools.
- The UK government also provides training to Indonesian police and the military through the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) and other institutions. Some of the people the UK government has trained, or may have trained, have gone on to commit alleged human rights violations such as unlawful killings.

¹⁴³Inger Aasgaard, ‘Risky identities and suspect communities – How pre-emptive counterterrorism surveillance in Norway is challenging the right to non-discrimination’, Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2015, pp. 53-61.

¹⁴⁴See, e.g. Miqdaad Versi, ‘Sunak wants to punish those who ‘vilify the UK’. That’s wrong – and he’s chosen the wrong target’ (The Guardian, 3 August 2022).

Indonesia has been a strategic ally for the UK government for many years.¹⁴⁵ In the relationship, the UK has traditionally prioritised ‘security’ and counter-terrorism considerations due to what it regards as the regional importance of Indonesia regarding these issues.¹⁴⁶ Counter-terrorism co-operation between the two states extends back to the oppressive days of the Soeharto era, although most UK government documents from that era remain secret and the full extent of the government’s support for repressive measures has never been revealed.¹⁴⁷ What is clear is that the UK government’s co-operation with its Indonesian counterparts came at a time when the Soeharto regime used counter-terrorism laws to repress opposition political parties, and in particular Muslim political expression.¹⁴⁸ We also know that the UK government has been supporting the Indonesian police through training since at least the early 1980s.¹⁴⁹

Post-Brexit, the UK also regards Indonesia as a key strategic ally for its political and economic engagement in Southeast Asia.¹⁵⁰ This prioritisation of Indonesia is occurring for trade as well as geopolitical reasons: the UK government wants to become a major power in the Indo-Pacific region, challenging the prominence of the United States and Australia, while limiting China’s impact.¹⁵¹ As part of their strengthened relationship, in April 2021 the two governments agreed to solidify their cooperation on issues of counterterrorism and P/CVE through a Memorandum of Understanding, before agreeing to a ‘Partnership Roadmap’ touching on security-related issues in April 2022.¹⁵² As outlined elsewhere in this report, the UK today appears to couple trade and ‘security’ in its international engagements – including by offering a P/CVE strategy that appeals to other governments that want to silence their critics, while at the same time solidifying and expanding its post-Brexit trade arrangements.

Generally, it appears that the UK government wants to export Prevent to other countries for relationship-building purposes and, it says, to share information about ‘best practices’ and counter international threats to the UK itself.¹⁵³ These ‘best practices’ appear to include Prevent-style P/CVE, despite the highly controversial nature of Prevent in the UK itself, and the government’s involvement in formulating the RAN CVE in Indonesia has led Indonesia to adopt a Prevent-style approach.

Although RSI’s consultations with UK government officials suggested that the government does consider respect for human rights laws when it forms such foreign partnerships, official documents and publicly available information about the UK government’s relationships with its Indonesian counterparts give human rights a limited role. Instead, these documents tend to prioritise the UK’s ‘security’ goals and assistance, with little – or no – reference to human rights.

At the same time, much of the UK government’s practice in this area lacks transparency. In July 2023, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) refused to disclose information RSI requested under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 relating to the FCDO’s involvement in Indonesian P/CVE efforts, citing national security concerns and a desire to protect international relations. RSI had requested, among other things, information about International Prevent Programme funding in Indonesia, as well as information about the UK’s role in the creation of the RAN CVE.

It is not only the UK government that is influential in ‘exporting’ problematic and potentially rights-violating P/CVE strategies; inter-governmental cooperation in this area is strong.

¹⁴⁵For more information on this relationship, see Down to Earth, [‘Business, human rights and climate in the UK-Indonesia relationship: How the UK government’s push for trade and investment risks making things worse for hard-pressed communities’](#) (Down to Earth, March 2014); Hugh Dowson, [‘Declassified British Documents Reveal U.K. Support for Indonesian Invasion and Occupation of East Timor, Recognition of Denial of Self-Determination, 1975-1976’](#) (The National Security Archive, date unknown).

¹⁴⁶Philip Hammond, [‘Speech to students of the Jakarta Defence Academy’](#) (Gov.uk, 16 January 2013).

¹⁴⁷Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [‘Counter-terrorism co-operation between the UK and Indonesia’](#), FCO National Archive reference 178/1576, FCO reference DC 020/305/1 (1991). The FCDO withholds this briefing from public view on the grounds of ‘security or other specified grounds’.

¹⁴⁸Alif Satria, [‘Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia’](#) (2022) 14(5) Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, p. 8.

¹⁴⁹Phil Evans, Keith Biddle and John Morris, [‘Evaluation of the Indonesian National Police Management Training Project, 1983-96’](#), Department for International Development Evaluation Report EV612 (February 1999).

¹⁵⁰HM Government, [‘Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’](#), CP 403 (March 2021), pp. 14-12, 66-67, 85; Ministry of Defence, [‘Defence in a competitive age’](#), CP 411 (March 2021), pp. 2, 5, 7, 12, 14, 16, 27-29, 32-33, 48-49, 57, 62. The British ambassador to Indonesia and Timor-Leste, Owen Jenkins, has described the UK-Indonesia relationship as ‘central’ to the UK’s foreign affairs: see Owen Jenkins, [‘UK must build new long-term partnerships with countries that will shape the future’](#) (The Jakarta Post, 17 December 2022). See also Flora Holmes, [‘The Future of Indonesia-UK Relations Post-Brexit’](#) (British Foreign Policy Group, 9 July 2021); Louisa Brooke-Holland, [‘Integrated Review 2021: The Defence tilt to the Indo-Pacific’](#), CBP 09217 (11 October 2021).

¹⁵¹Commentators have told the UK government that China poses increasing risks to UK interests due to its involvement in the region: House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations and Defence, [‘Corrected oral evidence: The UK’s security and trade relationship with China’](#), 14 April 2021.

¹⁵²Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, [‘Policy paper: Indonesia-United Kingdom Partnership Forum 2021: joint statement’](#) (Gov.uk, 7 April 2021), paras. 8-11; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, [‘Indonesia and UK Strengthen Cooperation to Overcome Pandemic and Terrorism’](#) (Kemlu.go.id, 7 April 2021); Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Elizabeth Truss, [‘UK-Indonesia Partnership Roadmap 2022 to 2024’](#) (Gov.uk, 19 April 2022).

¹⁵³See HM Government, [‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’](#), CP 903 (July 2023), paras. 68, 71, 83, 93, 165, 181.

¹⁵⁴Reference FOI2023/07941.

Indeed, the Indonesian government dedicates Pillar 3 of the RAN CVE to 'International Partnerships and Cooperation.'¹⁵⁵ For example, the United States government has funded the Densus 88 unit, while the European Union and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism have worked with the BNPT in its adoption of a 'whole of society' approach to P/CVE.¹⁵⁶ Additionally, we know that at least six governments currently support JCLEC's operation as well as the training it offers: the UK, Canada, Australia, Denmark, New Zealand and the Netherlands. (Other governments have also previously funded or supported JCLEC.)¹⁵⁷

Below, we outline the UK government's strategy for internationalising the Prevent programme. We then describe specific instances of UK government support for rights-violating and potentially rights-violating P/CVE practices in Indonesia, including assistance with law reform initiatives, training for Indonesian police and military officers, and funding for P/CVE programmes. Throughout, we discuss the results of the UK's support for Indonesian P/CVE efforts and how this has led to alleged human rights harms.

Exporting Prevent as a UK government strategy

The UK government explicitly prioritises exporting Prevent into other countries as part of the strategy. In the original Prevent strategy document from 2011, the government stated, 'All our counter-terrorism work has to have an international component to it and Prevent is no exception'. It went on to set broad parameters:

'We judge that Prevent overseas must wherever possible have a demonstrable impact on UK domestic security in general and the domestic Prevent agenda in particular. It otherwise needs to have an impact on risks which have a wider bearing on our national security.'¹⁵⁸

Subsequently, in its broader 2018 'CONTEST' counter-terrorism strategy, the UK government stated that

'[t]he UK actively supports the UN's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE), a comprehensive framework to establish a "whole of government" "whole of society" approach. We work with partners, including governments, the United Nations Development Programme, the Commonwealth, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum and the Hedayah Centre, which through UK-UAE support, launched a Task Force to support the development and implementation of National Action Plans to prevent and counter violent extremism.'¹⁵⁹

We do not know for certain whether the UK has supported the development of Indonesia's RAN through the Task Force alluded to above (the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force).

However, In researching this report, RSI interviewed an expert involved in planning and drafting Indonesia's RAN, who stated that they had the Prevent strategy on the table when they were engaged in high-level discussions and that Prevent influenced the drafting of the plan.

In any case, it appears that Indonesia is heavily mimicking both the UK's and the Task Force's approaches to P/CVE, as outlined below, suggesting that the Indonesian government, when formulating the RAN CVE, was at least influenced by international approaches to P/CVE.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 97-105.

¹⁵⁶On United States' engagement with Densus 88, see Human Rights First, '[Densus 88 and the Asia Pivot](#)' (Human Rights First, 31 January 2013); Mohammed Ilyas and Rayvinder Athwal, '[De-Radicalisation and Humanitarianism in Indonesia](#)' (2021) 10(3) Social Sciences 87, pp. 87-88, 90. On the European Union and United Nations' project, see 'United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, '[Crisis and Strategic Communications Training in Indonesia to Support a Whole-of-Society Approach in the Wake of a Terrorist Attack](#)' (United Nations, 2023).

¹⁵⁷See Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, '[JCLEC Donors](#)' (JCLEC, no date).

¹⁵⁸See HM Government, '[Prevent Strategy](#)', Cm 8092 (June 2011), paras. 6.78-10.205.

¹⁵⁹See HM Government, '[CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism](#)', Cm 9608 (June 2018), para. 84.

¹⁶⁰Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, '[Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism](#)' (no date). On the Indonesian government's engagement with the Task Force, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, '[Indonesia and the Counter-Terrorism Efforts](#)' (Kemlu.go.id, 7 April 2019).

Regardless of the UK's role through the Task Force – which itself is open to critique in human rights terms, given the UAE's poor human rights record, particularly when it comes to matters of national security – we know that the UK has exerted other diplomatic pressure on the Indonesian government's P/CVE law reform process.¹⁶¹

we know that the UK has exerted other diplomatic pressure on the Indonesian government's P/CVE law reform process

The UK government sees Indonesia as a key strategic ally – particularly post-Brexit – as a developing country with regional influence.¹⁶² For instance, in January 2016, then-UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Phillip Hammond highlighted British-Indonesian cooperation on counter-terrorism policing in a speech to Jakarta Defence Academy students, presenting Indonesian policing as important for UK security:

'While our military engagement in Asia is modest, the importance of the region for our national security is significant, centred not just on trade and commerce, some of our most significant trading partners are in Asia, but also on the fight against international terrorism.

Consequently it is vital that we identify reliable partners with whom we share values and interests and that we support those who contribute to peace, stability and freedom. At the strategic level, it is in the UK's interest to

assist with the preservation of peace and stability in this region. This is why we are keen to strengthen the relationship between our countries.

... Increasingly terrorist networks are sharing their tactics, knowledge and their training. We must do the same. The success of our co-operation on counter terrorism over the years, in particular co-operation between the Metropolitan Police and your Centre for Law Enforcement Co-operation, is an example of this response in action and has undoubtedly mitigated the threat to both countries from terrorist networks.'¹⁶³

These statements help show that the UK wants more political power and better trading relationships in the Indo-Pacific region, and (as in Hammond's statement) that it presents counter-terrorism cooperation as part of what it hopes will be an attractive bargain. The problem from a human rights perspective is that the bargain may be attractive to states such as Indonesia for the wrong reasons.

The example of China shows that the UK has been willing to offer 'counter-extremism' assistance even when it knows that the state in question is engaging in gross human rights abuses against the relevant population: from 2016 to 2017, the government funded P/CVE work in the Xinjiang region aimed at 'demonstrating the effectiveness of UK best practice' and conducted by a London-based 'think tank'.¹⁶⁵ During this period, well established media outlets and human rights groups were widely reporting on China's mass surveillance, arbitrary detention and the use of 're-education camps' against Uyghur Muslims.¹⁶⁶

In such cases, UK support may provide repressive regimes with a credibility boost and a means of

¹⁶¹On the UAE's human rights record, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, '2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab Emirates' (U.S. Department of State, 2022); Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2022: United Arab Emirates' (Human Rights Watch, 2022); Catherine Bennett, 'The Tories happily overlooked the UAE's human rights record - until it came for the Telegraph' (The Observer, 3 December 2023).

¹⁶²HM Government, 'Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy', CP 403 (March 2021), pp. 14-22, 66-67, 85. See also, Prime Minister's Office and Rishi Sunak, 'Prime Minister: the UK will be a firm friend to the Indo-Pacific' (Gov.uk, 15 November 2022).

¹⁶³Philip Hammond, 'Speech to students of the Jakarta Defence Academy' (Gov.uk, 16 January 2013).

¹⁶⁴Liz Truss, 'Britain is free and our exciting future lies FAR beyond Europe, says LIZ TRUSS' (Sunday Express, 6 November 2021).

¹⁶⁵See Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee and Emir Yazici, 'Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China's Changing Strategy in Xinjiang' (2020) 44(3) International Security 9; Robyn Dixon, 'Navalny is sentenced to 19 years for 'extremism' as Kremlin crushes dissent' (The Washington Post, 4 August 2023). The: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 'Countering the root causes of violent extremism undermining growth and stability in China's Xinjiang Region by sharing UK best practice', IATI Identifier: GB-GOV-3-PAP-CNF- 002340.

¹⁶⁶For an overview, see Lindsay Maizland, 'Backgrounder: China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang' (Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022).

reputation-laundering, given that at least some members of the international community appear to perceive Prevent as a legitimate strategy (notwithstanding serious and sustained criticism of Prevent from within the UK). Indeed, the UK has simultaneously been working to loosen international laws and standards that could affect P/CVE programmes, drafting and supporting UN Security Council resolutions that create scope for states to significantly widen the range of people whose freedoms they can restrict in the name of P/CVE (by allowing governments to take measures in the name of preventing ‘extremism’, as opposed to ‘violent extremism’).¹⁶⁷

“the UK has simultaneously been working to loosen international laws and standards that could affect P/CVE programmes”

The Indonesian government has been receptive to international involvement in its P/CVE efforts. During the consultation process for this report, several experts in both Indonesia and the UK asserted that the Indonesian government values its relationship with its international partners when it comes to counter-terrorism efforts, such as by seeking other governments’ views on counter-terrorism strategies, exploring opportunities to assist other governments, and receiving funding and training from them. In particular, the experts told us that the government is particularly keen to develop its relationships with the UK in this area. We see this approach crystallised in the RAN, with an entire strand of the strategy dedicated to ‘international partnerships and cooperation.’

This includes plans to increase the role of international donors in Indonesian P/CVE efforts and to increase international law enforcement cooperation.¹⁶⁸

Over the past five years, this development has generated a number of high-profile diplomatic meetings on issues of counter-terrorism and security, as well as several agreements or non-binding memorandums of understanding between the two states.¹⁶⁹ A few examples include:

- A series of ‘Partnership Forums’ designed to advance UK-Indonesia partnership on a range of issues not limited to security and counter-terrorism (2007, 2019, 2021);¹⁷⁰
- A memorandum of understanding on cybersecurity, detailing how the governments will cooperate to plan and respond to cyberattacks (2018);¹⁷¹
- An updated memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism, ‘to counter regional and international threats’ (2021);¹⁷²
- A ‘Cyber Security Dialogue’, to discuss issues related to perceived cyber threats (2021);¹⁷³
- The creation of a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, with the aim to ‘sustain our [the two governments’] close counter-terrorism cooperation’ (2021);¹⁷⁴ and
- A UK-Indonesia ‘Partnership Roadmap’ (2022-2024).¹⁷⁵

For the UK, based on what we can see from publicly available documents, this level of involvement in another state’s counter-terrorism or P/CVE policies is unusually extensive.

The UK’s three primary means of exporting Prevent to Indonesia that this research has identified are assistance with drafting changes to the laws, trainings for police and other security service personnel, and official development assistance – that is, funding. Each of these is a direct form of support for problematic and, in some instances, clearly rights-violating P/CVE practices.

¹⁶⁷United Nations Security Council Resolution 2686 (2023), [S/RES/2686 \(2023\)](#), 14 June 2023. For an overview, see the Twitter thread by Jordan Street, Senior Policy and Advocacy Lead at Saferworld, [11 June 2023](#); Andrew Mitchell, ‘UN Resolutions: Radicalism – Question for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’, UIN 189025, tabled 12 June 2023.

¹⁶⁸Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 97-105.

¹⁶⁹On the non-binding nature of these agreements, see John H. McNeill, ‘International Agreements: Recent U.S.-UK Practice Concerning the Memorandum of Understanding’ (1994) 88(4) American Journal of International Law

¹⁷⁰Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘Indonesia-United Kingdom Partnership Forum 2021: joint statement’ (Gov.uk, 7 April 2021).

¹⁷¹For a summary, see Ani Hasanah, ‘Indonesia and the United Kingdom explore cyber-security cooperation’ (VOI News, 15 August 2018).

¹⁷²Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘Policy paper: Indonesia-United Kingdom Partnership Forum 2021: joint statement’ (Gov.uk, 7 April 2021), paras. 8-11; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, ‘Indonesia and UK Strengthen Cooperation to Overcome Pandemic and Terrorism’ (Kemlu.go.id, 7 April 2021). This is not the first agreement between the two governments on counter-terrorism: see Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Mark Field and David Lidington, ‘UK and Indonesia agree to deepen partnership’ (Gov.uk, 18 June 2019).

¹⁷³For an overview, see Edna Tarigan, ‘Indonesia, UK discuss future technology and cybersecurity’ (AP News, 11 November 2021).

¹⁷⁴Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Elizabeth Truss, ‘UK-Indonesia Partnership Roadmap 2022 to 2024’ (Gov.uk, 19 April 2022), para. 15a; Petir Garda Bhwana, ‘Indonesia’s BNPT Head Confident of Counter-terrorism Cooperation with UK Benefiting Both Countries’ (Tempo.co, 19 December 2023).

Assisting in law reform initiatives

The UK government explicitly aims to internationalise its Prevent strategy, meaning that it seeks to advise other governments on how to run ‘counter-extremism’ programmes that are similar to Prevent.¹⁷⁶ It says it does this in order to foster stronger collaboration among its international partners on counter-terrorism, share information about ‘best practices’ and counter perceived international terrorism threats that could reach the UK.¹⁷⁷ In Indonesia, the UK government’s approach has involved direct intervention or impact.

As part of the research for this report, RSI discussed the evolution of the RAN CVE with practitioners who had been involved in formulating the strategy, and we also approached the UK government to ask it about its role.

In response to a request we submitted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office told us that it ‘does hold information relevant to [RSI’s] request,’ but that it would withhold the information on national security grounds.¹⁷⁸ This response suggests to us that the government was involved in some manner in the development of the RAN CVE, although it is refusing to disclose the details. Such involvement is consistent with the other evidence outlined in this section.

An Indonesian practitioner we interviewed who had been involved in formulating the country’s P/CVE strategy was more open. They told us that many members of the law reform committee in Indonesia were aware of the UK’s Prevent programme prior to the reform process, although they were unaware of how controversial the Prevent strategy has been in the UK.

However, the UK government’s influence appears to run deeper. The same Indonesian practitioner claimed that the UK government had started to exert diplomatic pressure the Indonesian government to reform its P/CVE laws following the passage of the UK’s Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This Act created the controversial ‘Prevent duty’, which imposes a legal obligation on UK public authorities (such as schools) to refer people to Prevent.¹⁷⁹ Some aspects of the Prevent duty have echoes in the RAN CVE. Although the Indonesian government does not impose a legal obligation on education providers, for instance, it does engrain counter-terrorism policy goals into educational settings by requiring education providers to be trained – and educate their students – on aspects of the RAN CVE and how to implement it.¹⁸⁰

Additionally, the Indonesian expert told us that they had a copy of the UK’s Prevent strategy next to them during committee meetings. They stated that they did not bring this into the meetings themselves; rather, an Indonesian government official asked them to review the strategy during the drafting process, with a view to implementing some of its aspects.¹⁸¹



an Indonesian government official asked [the RAN drafting committee] to review the [Prevent] strategy during the drafting process, with a view to implementing some of its aspects



¹⁷⁶See HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’, [CP 903](#) (July 2023), paras. 68, 71, 83, 93, 165, 181.

¹⁷⁷For example, see Cabinet Office, Department for Transport, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, HM Treasury, Home Office and Ministry of Defence, ‘[Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: programme summaries for Counter Terrorism Programme Fund 2019 to 2020](#)’ (Gov.uk, 30 April 2020), which explains that: ‘Our CSSF [the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, discussed below] support seeks to deliver the below outcomes:

- Stronger relationships and collaboration with international partners on CT [counter-terrorism] and security.
- Stronger understanding across the international community of the CT landscape.
- Increased knowledge on effective CT methodologies.’

See also [House of Lords, ‘Extremism’, vol. 717, Monday 22 February 2010](#), col 816, establishing that the Foreign Office spent over £80 million on Prevent in the three years prior to 2010.

¹⁷⁸RSI requested information relating to the [d]ates and locations of any meetings FCDO officials have had with the following Indonesian entities regarding Indonesia’s National Action Plan on Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism (RAN CVE), between January 2019 and April 2021, including information noting the FCDO officials’ team within the FCDO: 1) The President’s Office; 2) The National Counter-Terrorism Office (BNPT); 3) The Ministry of Law and Human Rights; 4) The Ministry of Home Affairs; 5) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 6) The Ministry of Religious Affairs; 7) Indonesia’s national human rights institutions, Komnas HAM and Komnas Perempuan; and 8) Academics, researchers and civil society organisations advising on the creation of the RAN CVE.’

¹⁷⁹[Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015](#), s26. For an analysis of the Prevent duty, see Joel Busher, Tufyal Choudhury, Paul Thomas and Gareth Harris, ‘[What the Prevent duty means for schools and colleges in England: An analysis of educationalists’ experiences](#)’ (July 2017); Lee Jerome, Alex Elwick and Raza Kazim, ‘[The Impact of the Prevent Duty on Schools: A Review of the Evidence](#)’ (2019) 45(4) British Educational Research Journal 821; Suke Wolton, ‘[The contradiction in the Prevent Duty: Democracy vs ‘British values’](#)’ (2017) 12(2) Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 123.

¹⁸⁰Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, pp. 22-27.

¹⁸¹The interviewee also recalled reviewing Dutch, French and German P/CVE strategies, as well as several others that they did not name.

This interviewee also stated that the committee had received training from the UK government during the reform process, although they declined to disclose the topic or content of this training.¹⁸² The same interviewee indicated a desire to implement some of the methodology and lessons from the UK's Prevent strategy when formulating the RAN.

While we do not know conclusively whether the UK pressured the reform committee into creating a Prevent-like strategy in Indonesia – the evidence suggests that several governments' P/CVE approaches have been influential there – these developments show that the UK government has been pushing the Prevent model abroad and that this effort has directly shaped Indonesia's P/CVE activities.

Official development assistance and the International Prevent Programme

Over the two decades since the beginning of the so-called 'war on terror', a reduction of UK and other government aid has coincided with a 'securitisation' of aid and development programmes, meaning that governments such as the UK's are more likely to fund other governments and civil society organisations if they create development or aid programmes that incorporate elements of counter-terrorism or P/CVE.¹⁸³ Such programmes are controversial, as they force civil society organisations to implement a counter-terrorism agenda.¹⁸⁴

The UK's approach to Prevent is no different, with various government departments funding both domestic and international P/CVE programmes.¹⁸⁵

The UK offers P/CVE-related funding through two streams: the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), and one of its sub-divisions, the International Prevent Programme.¹⁸⁶ In 2023, the government's provisional statistics state that it spent £352 million under the CSSF, up from the £307 million figure from 2022 (although down from the £426 million spent in 2021)¹⁸⁷ The amount of funding the FCDO allocates under the CSSF has been steadily declining since its 2019 peak of £659 million;¹⁸⁸ however, this does not give us the full picture, as some P/CVE-related support exists that appears to fall outside these two funding streams, and instead is allocated as general official development assistance. It may well be, therefore, that funding previously allocated under the CSSF is now being given a different label.¹⁸⁹

In 2023, the government's provisional statistics state that it spent £352 million under the CSSF, up from the £307 million figure from 2022

The CSSF is an inter-department funding programme, currently overseen by the Joint Funds Unit at the Cabinet Office.¹⁹⁰ This programme covers funding related to the entirety of CONTEST, the UK's counter-terrorism strategy. Based on our research, we conclude that the UK's international security assistance programme gives inadequate weight to human rights when the country is funding international P/CVE programmes, instead focusing on ostensibly 'effective' programming.

¹⁸²The interviewee also recalled receiving training from the Australian government during this process.

¹⁸³For a detailed explanation, see Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt, *The Securitization of Foreign Aid* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). See also Iliana Olivieri and Aitor Pérez, 'Whose and what aid securitisation? An analysis of EU aid narratives and flows' (2021) 42(8) *Third World Quarterly* 1903.

¹⁸⁴See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, 'Human rights impact of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism', Human Rights Council, Forty-third session, 24 February-10 March 2020, A/HRC/43/46, para. 44; Aries A. Arugay, Marc Batac and Jordan Street, 'An explosive cocktail: Counter-terrorism, militarisation and authoritarianism in the Philippines' (Saferworld and Initiatives for International Dialogue, 2021), pp. 23-24. Many commentators have explained that P/CVE has negatively altered women, peace and security agendas: see Jenny Lorentzen, 'Women as 'new security actors' in preventing and countering violent extremism in Mali' (2021) 97(3) *International Affairs* 721; Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, 'Challenging Conventional Wisdom, Transforming Current Practices: A Gendered Lens on P/CVE', in Beatrix Austin and Hans J. Giessmann (eds.), *Transformative Approaches to Violent Extremism* (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2018), pp. 28-33.

¹⁸⁵This report will only address the UK government's international Prevent funding. For an overview of domestic Prevent funding arrangements, see Suraj Lakhani, 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities' (2012) 51(2) *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 190; Charlotte Heath-Kelly, 'The geography of pre-criminal space: epidemiological imaginations of radicalisation risk in the UK Prevent Strategy, 2007-2017' (2017) 10(2) *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 297. The UK government also provides funding to the relevant UN institutions, which the UN may then subsequently use to finance domestic P/CVE efforts.

¹⁸⁶The International Prevent Programme falls under the Counter-Terrorism Programmes Fund: see Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, and Cabinet Office, 'CSSF Programme Summary: Counter-Terrorism Programmes Fund (CTPF), International Prevent Programme' (Gov.uk, 15 July 2021).

¹⁸⁷Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 'Statistics on International Development: Provisional UK Aid Spend 2023' (April 2024), p. 3. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, UK Aid and National Statistics, 'Statistics on International Development: Provisional UK Aid Spend 2022' (April 2023), p. 13.

¹⁸⁸Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, UK Aid and National Statistics, 'Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2019' (September 2020), p. 14.

¹⁸⁹We should also view these statistics in light of the UK government's gradual reduction in the amount of official development assistance and other funding it is willing to give.

¹⁹⁰See Cabinet Office; Conflict, Stability and Security Fund; Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office; Home Office and Ministry of Defence, 'Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund: annual report 2020 to 2021' (Gov.uk, 15 December 2021).

For example, in its 2019 to 2020 programme summary, the government explains:

'Our CSSF support seeks to deliver the below outcomes:

- ***Stronger relationships and collaboration with international partners on CT and security.***
- ***Stronger understanding across the international community of the CT landscape.***
- ***Increased knowledge on effective CT methodologies.'***¹⁹¹

While the CSSF is opaque – the government does not disclose all the forms of funding it gives under this stream – we know even less information about the International Prevent Programme.

From an official government document, we know the government claims that:

'The International Prevent Programme delivers on objectives under the overseas elements of the CONTEST strategy. The Prevent Programme works to reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups overseas by working with Governments, local Authorities, and international partners in reducing terrorists' ability to recruit and influence communities. The programme aims to reduce the risk in countries with significant UK exposure where specific radicalisation or recruitment hotspots exist.'¹⁹²

We provide relevant data from the CSSF alongside other relevant forms of official development assistance in Tables A, B and C below.¹⁹³ The government's annual transparency reports indicate that the UK also supports activities that are not eligible for official development assistance, both domestically and internationally, in the realm of counter-terrorism and countering violent 'extremism'; these have not been included in the tables below due to a lack of publicly available information. However, we do know that the figures noted in the tables below are significantly lower than the total value the UK government has spent on international P/CVE programming that is eligible for such official assistance, which amounted to £6.72 million in 2019-2020.¹⁹⁴

The UK government also states that it does not disclose some P/CVE budgeting to the public in order – it says – to protect national security.¹⁹⁵ Some CSSF/IPP funding is disclosed, but the details remain unclear. For instance, in 2017, we know that the FCDO supported a project in Indonesia entitled 'Supporting the host country's rule of law', which targeted 'security sector reform' around policing – this may have involved support for counter-terrorism and P/CVE operations, however we cannot be sure.¹⁹⁶ However, other recorded forms of official development assistance funding do not disclose the nature of the project, or on occasion even the receiving country. We can nonetheless draw some conclusions from the available data.

Based on this data, we conclude that there are several problematic – or potentially problematic – methods of P/CVE that the UK government has supported in Indonesia in recent years, some of which it may still be supporting today. These include: promoting 'religious moderation' and 'moderate Islam';¹⁹⁷ and the use of community-policing-related programmes.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹¹Cabinet Office, Department for Transport, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, HM Treasury, Home Office and Ministry of Defence, '[Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: programme summaries for Counter Terrorism Programme Fund 2019 to 2020](#)' (Gov.uk, 30 April 2020).

¹⁹²Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, and Cabinet Office, '[CSSF Programme Summary: Counter-Terrorism Programmes Fund \(CTPF\), International Prevent Programme](#)' (Gov.uk, 15 July 2021).

¹⁹³Official development assistance programmes conducted under the CSSF can be identified by the use of CSSF in their IATI reference.

¹⁹⁴These figures exclude P/CVE programmes not eligible for official development assistance funding: see Foreign and Commonwealth Office, '[Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Objectives 2019 to 2020](#)' (19 September 2019). See also Foreign and Commonwealth Office, '[Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: objectives 2018 to 2019](#)' (20 September 2018); Foreign and Commonwealth Office, '[Countering terrorism and violent extremism: objectives 2017 to 2018](#)' (16 February 2018).

¹⁹⁵See each of the transparency reports cited above. Indeed, some programmes listed on the UK Aid Development Tracker earlier in the research process no longer appear to be listed at time of writing. The request we submitted under the [Freedom of Information Act 2000](#) – which, among other things, sought to obtain data about CSSF and International Prevent Programme funding in Indonesia – was refused on national security grounds.

¹⁹⁷Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 'Promoting Moderate Islam in Indonesia through UK/Indonesia exchanges to Counter Extremist Ideologies and Reduce Terrorist Threats', IATI Identifier: [GB-GOV-3-PAP-IDJ-002292](#).

¹⁹⁸Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 'Countering Violent Extremism Through Community Policing', IATI Identifier: [GB-GOV-3-PAP-JAT-002360](#); Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 'Countering Violent Extremism Through Community Policing', IATI Identifier: [GB-GOV-3-PAP-JAT-002360](#).

Table A: P/CVE-related UK aid to Indonesia¹⁹⁹

Programme	IATI reference ²⁰⁰	State or region	Duration	Spend (if complete) or budget (if in progress)
Countering Violent Extremism Through Community Policing	GB-GOV-3-PAP-JAT-002360	Indonesia	February 2017-March 2017	£19,242
Defending Human Rights through the Indonesian Parliament	GB-GOV-3-PHR-IDJ-021701	Indonesia	April 2016-March 2017	£24,807
Promoting Moderate Islam in Indonesia through UK/Indonesia exchanges to Counter Extremist Ideologies and Reduce Terrorist Threats	GB-GOV-3-PAP-IDJ-002292	Indonesia	July 2016-December 2016	£17,147
Study on Drivers of Radicalisation in Indonesia	GB-1-201024	Indonesia	August 2009-January 2010	£14,968
Support to strengthen the capability of Islamic schools in Indonesia to promote human rights	GB-GOV-3-PAP-IDJ-002311	Indonesia	June 2016-December 2016	£19,776
Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules based International System in Indonesia	GB-GOV-3-HRRBIS-ID-FY19/20	Indonesia	April 2019-March 2020	£302,568
Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules based International System in Indonesia	GB-GOV-3-HRRBIS-ID	Indonesia	July 2018-March 2019	£326,303
Supporting reforms in Indonesia's prisons to minimise conditions enabling the spread of violent extremism and reducing the number of radicalised individuals both in prison and on release	GB-GOV-3-PAP-IDJ-002298	Indonesia	July 2016-February 2017	£10,664
Tackling radicalisation and extremism in Indonesia	GB-GOV-3-PHR-IDJ-051701	Indonesia	April 2016-March 2017	£36,901
TOTAL				£772,376

¹⁹⁹Information correct as at 12 January 2024. Source: [UK Aid Development Tracker](#). The UK Aid Development Tracker is updated frequently, with some sources of official development assistance being added and removed from the database.

²⁰⁰International Aid Transparency Index.

Table B: P/CVE-related UK aid on a regional or international basis with potential implications for Indonesia²⁰¹

Programme	IATI reference	State or region	Duration	Spend (if complete) or budget (if in progress)
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Asia	GB-GOV-3-CT-798-FY19/20	Asia	April 2019-March 2020	£14,220
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Asia	GB-GOV-3-Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism-798	Asia	April 2017-March 2018	£22,744
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Asia	GB-GOV-3-CT-798	Asia	May 2018-March 2019	£1,746,221
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in ODA-eligible countries in multiple regions	GB-GOV-3-CT-998-FY19/20	Unspecified ²⁰²	April 2019-March 2020	£5,805,843
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in ODA-eligible countries in multiple regions	GB-GOV-3-Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism-998	Unspecified	July 2017-March 2018	£413,886
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in ODA-eligible countries in multiple regions	GB-GOV-3-CT-998	Unspecified	April 2018-March 2019	£3,196,855
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia	GB-GOV-3-Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism-679	South Asia	April 2017-March 2018	−£2,510
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia	GB-GOV-3-CT-679	South Asia	July 2018-March 2019	£46,655
Countering violent extremism in ODA eligible country	GB-GOV-3-PHR-UBT-051701	Unspecified	April 2016-March 2017	£35,000
Global Programme on Development Solutions for the Prevention of Violent Extremism	XM-DAC-41114-PROJECT-00106904	Unspecified	October 2017-December 2020	\$1,183,256
Multilateral Championing Our Values	GB-GOV-52-CSSF-01-000001	Unspecified	April 2017-March 2020	£5,090,000

²⁰¹Information correct as at 12 January 2024. Source: UK Aid Development Tracker.

²⁰²The database uses 'unspecified' to refer to a range of countries from different regions. Projects included in Table 2, by virtue of their locality or project description, appear to have a direct impact in Indonesia, because the database listing includes Indonesia as a potential target country for the intervention.

Programme	IATI reference	State or region	Duration	Spend (if complete) or budget (if in progress)
Preventing Genocide and Countering Extremism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East	GB-GOV-3-PHR-MUL-051701	Africa, Asia and the Middle East	April 2016-March 2017	£9,158
Researching Radicalisation and Violent Extremism	GB-1-200462	Unspecified	June 2009-September 2009	£46,902
Roundtable meeting on how education can build resilience to violent extremism	GB-GOV-3-WP1510	Unspecified	April 2016-March 2017	£54,800
To increase knowledge and evidence on role women and violent extremism and terrorism	GB-1-204071	Unspecified	September 2014-March 2015	£35,000
TOTAL				£17,398,538²⁰³

Table C: P/CVE-related UK aid targeted at other countries or regions²⁰⁴

Programme	IATI reference	State or region	Duration	Spend (if complete) or budget (if in progress)
A research study into radicalisation in the Bangladeshi prison system	GB-GOV-3-PSA-BAD-300006	Bangladesh	June 2016-September 2016	£3,655
Building Community Trust to CVE Phase III	GB-GOR-GB-GOR-OT1175-467	Tunisia	June 2019-May 2021	€1,247,861
Building Resilience in Civil Society Phase II (BRICS II - aka CREATE)	GB-SC-SC030289-91402	East Africa	August 2019-Present	£11,951,195

²⁰³Value of programmes not listed as GBP calculated based on the conversion rate at the beginning of the specified project period.

²⁰⁴Information correct as at 12 January 2024. Source: [UK Aid Development Tracker](#).

Programme	IATI reference	State or region	Duration	Spend (if complete) or budget (if in progress)
Countering Extremism Through Education Reform in Egypt	GB-GOV-3-PMN-BIPB-EAC-1713001	Egypt	June 2016-March 2017	£25,520
Countering Extremism: Empowering Muslim youth to recognize and reject extremist ideology	GB-GOV-3-PSA-IND-400024	India	September 2016-March 2016	£3,809
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa	GB-GOV-3-CT-298-FY19/20	Africa	April 2019-March 2020	£133,347
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa	GB-GOV-3-Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism-298	Africa	April 2017-March 2018	£3,352,581
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa	GB-GOV-3-CT-298	Africa	April 2018-March 2019	£813,216
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Europe	GB-GOV-3-Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism-89	Europe	December 2017-March 2018	£70,718
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Middle East	GB-GOV-3-CT-589-FY19/20	Middle East	April 2019-February 2020	£442,764
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Middle East	GB-GOV-3-Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism-589	Middle East	April 2017-March 2018	£2,317,954
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Middle East	GB-GOV-3-CT-589	Middle East	April 2018-March 2019	£776,065

Programme	IATI reference	State or region	Duration	Spend (if complete) or budget (if in progress)
Countering the root causes of violent extremism undermining growth and stability in China's Xinjiang Region by sharing UK best practice	GB-GOV-3-PAP-CNF-002340	China	June 2016-March 2017	£12,113
Countering Violent Extremism By Developing Youth Literacy in Gaza	GB-GOV-3-PMN-BIPB-OPT-1715001	Occupied Palestinian Territories	June 2016-April 2017	£11,016
Countering violent extremism in Sri Lanka	GB-GOV-3-PSA-SLC-151621	Sri Lanka	April 2016-March 2017	£-10,383
Countering Violent Extremism in the Palestinian Camps by Transforming no-go Facilities into safe public spaces	GB-GOV-3-PMN-BIPB-LEB-1721001	Lebanon	October 2016-May 2017	£7,343
CSSF East Africa: Northern Mozambique – Southern United Republic of Tanzania – Building Resilience against Violent Extremism	XM-DAC-47066-PE.0035	East Africa	April 2023-Present	£742,667
East Africa Preventing Violent Extremism	GB-GOV-52-CSSF-03-000018	Africa	April 2018-March 2020	£4,000,000
Empowering Palestinian Institutions and Civil Society in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – EPICS OPTs	GB-GOV-1-400030	Occupied Palestinian Territories	July 2023-Present	£34,999,984

Programme	IATI reference	State or region	Duration	Spend (if complete) or budget (if in progress)
GCRF Gender and Violent Extremism Network	GB-GOV-13-FUND—GCRF-EP_T003502_1	Kenya	December 2019-June 2021	£75,511
Généralisation Police de Proximité	XM-DAC-4114-PROJECT-00117861	Tunisia	March 2019-April 2021	\$1,182,015
Middle East Expertise Exchange with Mexico	GB-GOV-3-PAM-MEX-000084	Mexico	April 2016-March 2017	£32,013
P/CVE – Somali Strategy and Action Plan	XM-DAC-41114-PROJECT-00114199	Somalia	September 2018-Present	\$3,536,344
Partnership for a Tolerant and Inclusive Bangladesh	XM-DAC-41114-PROJECT-00086326	Bangladesh	January 2017-Present	\$7,161,307
Peace and Stability in Mozambique Programme	GB-GOV-1-301326	Mozambique	November 2021-Present	£500,000
PHM: Sharing of UK experience to counter violent extremism and support conflict resolution in Mindanao	GB-GOV-3-PAP-PHM-002325	Philippines	May 2016-March 2017	£16,162
Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism through Cross-Border Community Policing in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan	GB-CHC-1043843-USStateDpt_U002	Kyrgyzstan	February 2013-February 2016	£1,243,507

Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanzania	XM-DAC-41114-PROJECT-00102787	Tanzania	March 2017-December 2021	\$5,467,220
Promoting Human-Rights and Pro-Democracy Values through multimedia	GB-GOV-3-PMN-BIPB-SYD-175001	Syria	June 2016-April 2017	£25,800
Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in Northern and Coastal regions of Kenya (RE-INVENT)	GB-COH-3799145-781-217382KE	Kenya	April 2019-Present	£19,549,996
Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the Northern Territories (Re-INVENT)	GB-GOV-1-300147	Kenya	February 2018-Present	£20,499,998
Somalia Counter Extremism Programmes	GB-GOV-52-CSSF-03-000026	Somalia	April 2018-March 2020	£4,800,000
Strengthening Institutional Engagement and Capacity on Issues of Migration and Countering Violent Extremism	GB-GOV-3-PAF-SDK-160004	Sudan	April 2016-March 2017	£7,129
Tackling extremism in Commonwealth countries	GB-GOV-3-PMP-RBIS-MUL-011701	Unspecified	April 2016-March 2017	£9,433
Tolerance and Dialogue for Peace	XM-DAC-41114-PROJECT-00128737	Somalia	January 2021-Present	\$629,081
Western Balkans Programme	GB-GOV-52-CSSF-10-000001	Unspecified	April 2017-March 2019	£22,350,000
TOTAL				£144,174,476²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵Value of programmes not listed as GBP calculated based on the conversion rate at the beginning of the specified project period.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these tables. Firstly, the data demonstrates the UK government's clear intention to use funding to develop its international influence on P/CVE operations.

Secondly, the UK's approach to financing P/CVE-related efforts appear to target interventions in particular regions and states. There is a heavy focus on majority-Muslim countries, territories and regions, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Egypt, Somalia, Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the 'Middle East'. Alongside these areas, the UK government also appears to focus on countries and regions with large Muslim minorities (e.g. India, Kenya, Tanzania and 'East Africa').

The amount of funding the UK has devoted to P/CVE in Indonesia, specifically, suggests that the government has a clear influence on how both state actors and civil society organisations in the country carry out these activities.

Although some UK-funded programmes have a stated aim of ensuring 'human rights' compliance within the Indonesian legal and political systems, official development assistance in the form of P/CVE funding instead focuses on the 'efficacy' of P/CVE initiatives, with limited reference to human rights laws or norms.²⁰⁶ Several of the academics and civil society actors consulted for this project perceived the same focus in P/CVE practices. Although some argued that P/CVE is a method of upholding human rights (a perspective with which we disagree, given that P/CVE programmes so often involve rights violations), they could not recall examples of defined 'human-rights-oriented' P/CVE funding.

The UK's funding involves support for several problematic practices, including those promoting 'religious moderation' and 'moderate Islam'; and those involving community policing.

As discussed above, each of these focal points for UK government financial support leads to distinct and tangible human rights harms. The focus on 'religious moderation' or 'moderate Islam' designates members of minority communities as 'extremist' when they hold religious views that the government does not approve. In turn, this creates certain 'suspect communities', which in many instances are already disadvantaged in their society.²⁰⁷ The use of community policing programmes exacerbates these harms, as people the government deems to hold 'moderate' views are tasked with policing these 'suspect communities'. These practices are not compatible with the human right to freedom of religion and belief.

Each of these types of P/CVE support aid both the Indonesian and UK governments' priorities in engaging in rights-violating P/CVE. As discussed earlier in this report, the focus on 'religious moderation' and community policing apparently helps to gain support for the government among the Indonesian public and creates an 'other' group which the public perceives as dangerous. Thus, the government silences groups and communities that disagree with its policies. From the UK's perspective, the focus on 'religious moderation' feeds into the Islamophobic tendencies of UK P/CVE policy, while further ensuring that the UK can strengthen its influence over the Indonesian government as well as the wider region.

“From the UK's perspective, the focus on 'religious moderation' is consistent with Islamophobic tendencies”

²⁰⁶For instance, see Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 'Defending Human Rights through the Indonesian Parliament', IATI Identifier: [GB-GOV-3-PHR-IDJ-021701](#). We discuss this point in our 2022 report: Rights & Security International, 'Secret, Confused and Illegal: How the UK Handles Personal Data Under Prevent' (2022), paras. 49-50, 58, 131, 155.

²⁰⁷See Paddy Hillyard, *Suspect Community: People's Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain* (London: Pluto Press, 1993); Imran Awan, "I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist": How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a "Suspect" Community' (2012) 40(6) *Politics & Policy* 1158.

Training law enforcement and the security services

Military and police training has formed a part of the UK's foreign policy since at least the colonial era.²⁰⁸ Governments often see training as a means not only to strengthen police, military and security services across the globe, but also to impose their foreign policy objectives.²⁰⁹ For instance, both the United States' and the then-Soviet Union's well known 'proxy wars' during the Cold War involved military training for their partners.²¹⁰

Likewise, the UK government often provides training and other forms of logistical support to its international partners as a key pillar of its foreign policy, and indeed as part of its international counter-extremism and counter-terrorism strategies.²¹¹ In the original version of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, the government claimed that '[s]uccess in counter-terrorism depends on international collaboration. We will support key allies in building their capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorists overseas' and that '[t]he police and Security Service will continue to improve their ability to work locally, nationally and with our international partners to counter the threat.'²¹² Such an approach has continued following the 2018 review of CONTEST.²¹³ The government also provides some international P/CVE support via the UK military.²¹⁴

Although the nature and degree of support the government offers its partners varies, broadly speaking we define 'other logistical support' as including (among other things):

- Provision of arms or export licences authorising private companies to sell arms to foreign governments;²¹⁵
- Provision of technology, including surveillance technology;²¹⁶ and
- Intelligence sharing.²¹⁷

“ when the UK government claims it is supporting P/CVE abroad, it is in fact supporting other governments' policing and military operations ”



²⁰⁸On military training, see William Wallace, 'Foreign policy and national identity in the United Kingdom' (1991) 67(1) *International Affairs* 65; Chester A. Crocker, 'Military Dependence: the Colonial Legacy in Africa' (1974) 12(2) *Journal of Modern African Studies* 265. On law enforcement training, see Georgina Sinclair and Chris A. Williams, 'Home and Away: The Cross-Fertilisation between 'Colonial' and 'British' Policing, 1921-85' (2007) 35(2) *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 221; Liam O'Shea, 'Improving the UK's Contribution to International Policing' (2010) 4(1) *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 38. In recent years, many former members of Northern Ireland's Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) – who served during the period of conflict in the region – have become heavily involved in international police training. The RUC's methods were themselves drawn from colonial counter-insurgency policing: see Georgina Sinclair, 'Exporting the UK Police Brand: The RUC-PSNI and the International Policing Agenda' (2012) 6(1) *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 55.

²⁰⁹For example, see David H. Bayley, 'Police Reform as Foreign Policy' (2016) 38(2) *Journal of Criminology* 206. For an overview of the theory and practice in this area, see Frédéric Lemieux (ed.), *International Police Cooperation: Emerging issues, theory and practice* (London: Routledge, 2010).

²¹⁰Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict' (2010) 104(3) *American Political Science Review* 415. For a contemporary example, see Vladimir Rauta and Andrew Mumford, 'Proxy Wars and the Contemporary Security Environment', in Robert Dover, Huw Dylan and Michael S. Goodman (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

²¹¹For instance, the government argues that its international collaboration on counter-terrorism 'promote[s] our values and interests': see HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism', Cm 9608 (June 2018), para. 292.

²¹²HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism', Cm 8123 (July 2011), para. 4.8 and para. 4.36 respectively.

²¹³In which the government states that '[w]e will support capability building to ensure our international partners have the effective local responses they need to tackle the threat in their regions. But we will also take the lead on international efforts to improve specific aspects of counter-terrorism globally, through Ministerially-led campaigns on aviation security and preventing terrorist use of the internet. To allow us to respond rapidly to emerging risks, we will create a new cadre of experts who can be deployed when and where they are needed to provide additional expertise overseas, to help partners build capability at a local level.': see HM Government, 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism', Cm 9608 (June 2018), para. 93.

²¹⁴For example, in Kenya: see Ministry of Defence, 'Defence in a competitive age', CP 411 (March 2021), para. 5.18. In Indonesia, we know that the UK government held several courses for Indonesian military partners in the UK – between the British Army and the Royal Navy, they held at least 8 courses in 2018-19 and 11 in 2019-20: see Lydia Day, Frank Ledwidge, Stuart Casey-Maslen and Mark Goodwin-Hudson, 'Avoiding civilian harm in partnered military operations: The UK's responsibility', (Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, 2023), p. 54.

²¹⁵For an overview of the UK government's practice, see Esme Kirk-Wade, 'UK arms exports: statistics' (House of Commons Library, 16 January 2023). See, for example, the UK Court of Appeal's judgment in *R (on the application of Campaign Against the Arms Trade) v. Secretary of State for International Development* [2019] EWCA Civ 1020.

²¹⁶Jamie Doward and Rebecca Lewis, 'UK 'exporting surveillance technology to repressive nations'' (The Guardian, 7 April 2012). This often involves supporting the private sector in exporting technology: see UK Trade & Investment and Home Office, 'Increasing our security exports: A new government approach' (2014).

²¹⁷For an overview, see MI5 'Partnerships' (MI5); National Crime Agency, 'International network' (NCA).

The UK government assists Indonesia in each of these areas.²¹⁸ In this section we mainly address the UK government's provision of training to the Indonesian law enforcement and security services, although it may also be supporting the Indonesian government's P/CVE operations in ways that it has not disclosed publicly. Again, the predominance of military and policing support does not match with the UK's claim that its P/CVE work is not part of policing (and indeed that Prevent is not a policing programme). Rather, when the UK government claims it is supporting P/CVE abroad, it is in fact supporting other governments' policing and military operations.

In September 2020, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, James Heapey, explained the UK armed forces' support for counter-terrorism operations in other countries as follows:

'UK Armed Forces are currently operating in support of counterterrorism operations in four countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Mali), are presently providing counterterrorism training to an additional nine partner nations: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Maldives, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia...'²¹⁹

At the same time, some UK police forces have also sent officers to conduct policing training in the country, including the Metropolitan Police.²²⁰ At the same time, some UK police forces have also sent officers to conduct policing training in the country, including the Metropolitan Police.

Over the past five years, the Metropolitan Police has come under increased scrutiny for being 'institutionally racist, misogynistic and homophobic', and for its undercover policing of non-violent campaigners and trade unions, raising concerns that the UK is dispatching rights-violating institutions to train others.²²¹

The counter-terrorism training the UK government offers its Indonesian counterparts is principally conducted through the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), a self-defined 'international centre for law enforcement cooperation' established in 2004 following the Bali Bombings.²²² The JCLEC trains Indonesian law enforcement and security service officers – including Brimob and Densus 88 – on a range of topics, including analytical skills, forensics and surveillance, and incident response.²²³ The UK government has conducted or supported counter-terrorism training through JCLEC since the latter's formation, while it is also currently the JCLEC's second largest funder after the Australian government.²²⁴ As well as its training at the JCLEC, we know the UK government trains members of the Indonesian police force and the armed forces, both in the UK and at its jungle warfare academy in Brunei.²²⁵

²¹⁸On the provision of arms and export licences, see Esme Kirk-Wade, '[UK arms exports: statistics](#)' (House of Commons Library, 16 January 2023), p. 21; Deni Ghifari, '[UK-Indonesia defence partnership deeper than just export deals: UK official](#)' (Jakarta Post, 8 November 2022); Andrew Smith, '[Legal action launched against UK government's arms to Indonesia policy](#)' (Campaign Against the Arms Trade, 10 December 2003). On technology exports, see Ranil Jayawardena, '[Internally Displaced People: Indonesia](#)', UIN 109603, tabled on 30 October 2020. On intelligence sharing, see Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Elizabeth Truss, '[UK-Indonesia Partnership Roadmap 2022 to 2024](#)' (Gov.uk, 19 April 2022), para. 12.

²¹⁹James Heapey, '[Military Aid: Counter-terrorism – Question for the Ministry of Defence](#)', UIN 78789, tabled on 22 July 2020.

²²⁰For a concise overview, see Rory James, '[UK government cannot say if it has trained Indonesian police forces implicated in human rights abuse](#)' (Byline Times, 1 September 2021).

²²¹On institutional racism, misogyny and homophobia, see Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, '[Final Report: An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#)' (March 2023); for a summary see Vikram Dodd, '[Met police found to be institutionally racist, misogynistic and homophobic](#)' (The Guardian, 21 March 2023). On undercover policing, see Paul Lewis and Rob Evans, '[Secrets and lies: untangling the UK 'spy cops' scandal](#)' (The Guardian, 28 October 2020); the UK's Undercover Policing Inquiry is still in the process of receiving evidence at the time of writing.

²²²Sidney Jones, '[Twenty years after Bali](#)' (The Interpreter, 6 January 2023).

²²³Ranil Jayawardena, '[Internally Displaced People: Indonesia](#)', UIN 109603, tabled on 30 October 2020.

²²⁴The UK government has publicly reiterated its ongoing support for JCLEC over this period: see Philip Hammond, '[Speech to students of the Jakarta Defence Academy](#)' (Gov.uk, 16 January 2013); Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Scott Wightman, '[UK is extensively involved in Southeast Asia: Speech by Scott Wightman](#)' (Gov.uk, 18 July 2018); Mark Field, '[The Future of ASEAN-UK Cooperation, Post-Brexit](#)' (Gov.uk, 8 November 2018). Several other governments have also offered financial or logistical support to JCLEC. On the Australian government's role, see John Coyne, '[The future of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation](#)' (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017); Marni Cordell, '[Australia trained Indonesian police officer accused of West Papua violence](#)' (The Guardian, 2 August 2021). Some commentators have argued that Australia-Indonesia relations in this area have stagnated, and that there is therefore scope for another international actor to take the lead in developing Indonesia's law enforcement and security service capacity: see Shara Yosevina Simanjuntak, '[Analisis Kerja Sama Bilateral Indonesia Dengan Australia Dalam Penanggulangan Terrorisme Sebagai Kejahatan Transnasional Terorganisir \(2002-2015\)](#)' (2016) 2(3) Journal of International Relations 117; Antonia Mayaningtyas and Nursalim, '[Pengembangan Organisasi: Jakarta Centre Law Enforcement Cooperation \(JCLEC\) Dalam Membangun Kerjasama Multilateral](#)' (2021) 2(2) Public Service and Governance Journal 1.

²²⁵The Ministry of Defence does not collect data on which divisions trainees are a part of: see Rory James, '[UK government cannot say if it has trained Indonesian police forces implicated in human rights abuse](#)' (Byline Times, 1 September 2021), which includes the statistics the Ministry of Defence provided the author in response to a freedom of information request. The Ministry of Defence explains that the International Defence Training Academy (Army) 'helps deliver training to over 1,500 International Students annually, from over 110 Partner Nations, attending over 170 different courses with the British Army': see Ministry of Defence, '[International Defence Training \(Army\)](#)' (Army.mod.uk).

Supporting the JCLEC also has benefits for the UK regionally and internationally, with UK representatives training officers from over 80 countries at the institution.²²⁶

Many politicians and commentators have praised the JCLEC for increasing the efficacy of the Indonesian police and security services, while also improving respect for human rights.²²⁷ However, its success in the latter is far from certain: journalists have reported numerous alleged incidents of JCLEC-trained officers committing serious human rights abuses, principally unlawful killings.

For instance, in June 2021, a joint military operation involving Brimob, which is ostensibly a part of the Indonesian police force, and military units allegedly killed three unarmed Papuan civilians.²²⁸ Since at least 2018, journalists have also highlighted human rights abuses allegedly committed by a JCLEC-trained police chief, Untung Sangaji, who has reportedly spearheaded unlawful killings, torture and ill treatment in Aceh and Papua. (We have been unable to find information about how Sangaji has responded to the allegation of torture.) Sangaji claims to have been in regular contact with his international counterparts from the United States, the UK, and Australia following a period of training at JCLEC.²²⁹

While the UK government has stated that it does not provide support for military or policing operations in West Papua, Indonesian officers are often transferred or redeployed to other regions following their training, as occurred with Sangaji; therefore, it is highly likely that the tactics and knowledge UK trainers are providing through JCLEC and other training programmes ultimately end up being used in the region.²³⁰ Additionally, several of the experts interviewed for this report were sceptical about how the UK government could confidently assert that it had not trained officers who later take part in operations in West Papua, in part due the broad trainee base for JCLEC operations and the fact that the UK supports a wide range of JCLEC programmes,

and also because it can sometimes be unclear who is participating in which programmes. For clarity, the evidence we have does not indicate that the UK government or trainers representing it knowingly advise their counterparts to commit human rights abuses, but rather hold influence over Indonesian officers and therefore are in a position to urge rights-compliant counter-terrorism or P/CVE operations – or, to the contrary, share techniques that violate rights. The UK is also training individuals from forces that it knows or should know engage in abuses (or, at minimum, are unaccountable).

The UK government cannot claim it is unaware of the situation and the allegations in Papua – as several debates before the UK Parliament in recent years will attest.²³¹ Rather, the UK government has apparently concluded that it is politically convenient to wilfully ignore the situation and claim that it does not support or train JCLEC officers that operate in the region, without providing evidence to support that contention. This wilful ignorance (or, potentially, decision to ignore a dire human rights situation) appears to reflect the UK's political goals of greater trade and influence in Indonesia and the broader region, as well as the toothless nature of the UK's own accountability mechanisms, discussed in the following section.

“ the UK government has apparently concluded that it is politically convenient to wilfully ignore the situation [in Papua] and claim that it does not support or train JCLEC officers that operate in the region, without providing evidence to support that contention. This wilful ignorance... appears to reflect the UK's political goals ”

²²⁷For example, see the UK and Indonesian government statements cited throughout this section.

²²⁸Hengky Yeimo and Abeth You, 'Police allegedly shoot three civilians in Papua's Iilaga: Rights activists' (West Papua Daily, 7 June 2021); Human Rights Papua, 'Joint security forces execute three indigenous Papuans in Puncak Regency – Three others injured by bullets' (Human Rights and Peace for Papua, 17 November 2021); Rory James, 'UK government cannot say if it has trained Indonesian police forces implicated in human rights abuse' (Byline Times, 1 September 2021). Government officials state that the killings took place as part of a gunfight between the police and 'several armed Papuan terrorists that torched various facilities of the Aminggaru Airport in Iilaga', and that the West Papua National Liberation Army holds responsibility for the killings: see Evarukdijati and Rahmad Nasution, 'Three villagers found dead following gunfight near Iilaga Airport' (Antara News, 5 June 2021).

²²⁹Marni Cordell, 'Australia trained Indonesian police officer accused of West Papua violence' (The Guardian, 2 August 2021).

²³⁰Ranil Jayawardena, 'Internally Displaced People: Indonesia', UIN 109603, tabled on 30 October 2020.

²³¹House of Lords, 'West Papua: UN Access', Vol 829, 17 April 2023; Westminster Hall, 'West Papua: Human Rights', Vol 659, 8 May 2019. For a summary of the April 2023 debate, see Finau Fonua, 'UK govt confronted on West Papua in House of Lords' (RNZ, 21 April 2023).

While we recognise that training alone often is not the sole cause of human rights violations, it can have a significant impact on practice. Below we argue that the UK government should be doing more to ensure that abuses in Indonesia do not occur. Further, when assessing the UK government's role in Indonesia's P/CVE strategy – elements of which are taught as part of the JCLEC curriculum²³² – we reiterate that, as we believe the UK government's Prevent strategy to itself violate the UK's international human rights commitments, any attempt to export Prevent to other countries cannot be rights-compliant.

With its strategic aim of 'tilting' to the Indo Pacific, gaining regional influence and concluding trade deals, alongside the underlying Islamophobia that underpins its P/CVE and other international security strategies, the UK government has objectives that fall hand-in-hand with those of its Indonesian counterparts. Simply put, we argue that the UK government sees Indonesia – with its large Muslim population but officially secular nature – as an ideal place for exporting its own P/CVE methodologies. (Even though these have never been proven to prevent violence.)

In this section, we have outlined various methods of UK government support when it comes to 'exporting Prevent', principally through the provision of funding to Indonesian civil society organisations and the government to conduct problematic P/CVE strategies, assisting in the Indonesian government's formulation of the RAN CVE, and training law enforcement and the security services in how to conduct counter-terrorism and P/CVE operations. These forms of influence have directly impacted P/CVE in Indonesia, with the effect of creating or otherwise supporting some of the rights violations we have detailed above. In the next section, we look at the failures within the UK's system for ensuring its international assistance upholds human rights

A TOOTHLESS FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND 'SECURITY' ASSISTANCE

- The UK government has a system for regulating its assistance to other governments in security and justice sector reform. Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) assessments aim to 'support[]' UK values and be 'consistent with [the UK's] domestic and international human rights obligations'.
- However, OSJA assessments appear to be ineffective in practice, giving little to no weight to human rights concerns.
- The government's approach to OSJA assessments also lacks transparency, and we do not know whether human rights objections actually preclude forms of international assistance in security and justice matters.
- As a result, the UK government has the power to support overseas justice and security reforms that violate fundamental human rights without public or other scrutiny.

²³²For an outline, see United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, '[Global South Initiatives to Counter Terrorism and Prevent Violent Extremism: Handbook](#)' (2022), pp. 14-15; Cameron Sumpter and Joseph Franco, '[Islamist Militancy in Indonesia and the Philippines: Domestic Lineage and Sporadic Foreign Influence](#)' (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 15 September 2021).

The UK government plays a role in global legal development efforts and provides assistance to governments wishing to develop their ‘security’ sectors.²³³ While we recognise that reform processes take time, we argue that the UK government is not doing enough (and in fact may be doing very little) to ensure that the Indonesian government’s P/CVE efforts comply with human rights laws – and that there are not enough systems in place domestically to prevent it from supporting abusive individuals and police, military or intelligence agencies.

While some governments, such as that of the United States, have adopted laws to provide clarity around how the state should with other governments when human rights concerns exist, the UK government relies on policy – not binding laws.²³⁴ This policy framework does have lofty aims, ostensibly seeking to ensure that the UK’s assistance to overseas justice and security operations ‘supports our values and is consistent with our domestic and international human rights obligations.’²³⁵ In theory, this should prevent the UK government from supporting the types of human rights violations we have outlined above, such as killings, torture, disappearances and clear violations of the freedom of religion. In practice, however, Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) assessments have limited impact and do not prevent the UK government from giving support to foreign regimes that is then used to commit serious human rights violations.

OSJA assessments... do not prevent the UK government from giving support to foreign regimes that is then used to commit serious human rights violations

To complete an OSJA assessment, the relevant government department must take four steps:

- 1. Assess: Assess the internal situation in the host country, its stability, and its attitude towards international human rights law and humanitarian law;**
- 2. Identify: Identify the international human rights and humanitarian law risks associated with the proposed assistance;**
- 3. Mitigate: What steps can be taken to mitigate the risks?; and**
- 4. Strengthen: Strengthen security, justice and human rights.’²³⁶**

OSJA guidance applies to both ‘case specific assistance’ and larger ‘capacity building assistance’.²³⁷ The financing of P/CVE programmes, as well as the provision of individual policing and law enforcement training initiatives, would fall within the latter category, as a means of capacity building for local civil society, law enforcement, security services and the military.²³⁸

Frankly, despite this guidance, we do not know how OSJA assessments take place. With no public disclosures of completed OSJA assessments, nor any independent oversight body to review whether decision-makers attach sufficient weight to human rights considerations, individual civil servants and ministers are at liberty to act as they please – with increasing trade and advancing the UK’s foreign policy as the overriding goals, and human rights considerations playing little to no role.²³⁹

²³³For example, see Jonathan Allen, ‘[Advocating for security sector governance and reform](#)’ (Gov.uk, 3 December 2020).

²³⁴In the United States, the examples are the so-called ‘Leahy Laws’ which prevent the Department of Defence from using funds to assist foreign security forces when doing so could lead to credible allegations of assisting in the commission of serious human rights violations: see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘[About the Leahy Law: Fact Sheet](#)’ (U.S. Department of State, 20 January 2021). Although many commentators have found gaps in these laws which prevent them from reaching their objective: see Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘[Rethinking U.S. Security Assistance Beyond the Leahy Law](#)’ (Just Security, 28 June 2017); Lora Lumpe, ‘[What the Leahy Law Means for Human Rights](#)’ (Open Society Foundations: Voices, 24 April 2014).

²³⁵Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘[Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance](#)’ (26 January 2017), para. 1. The guidance has not been updated since January 2017, yet still remains in force.

²³⁶Under the final heading (‘strengthen’), the government also advises questioning whether ‘there [is] a serious risk that the assistance might directly contribute to a violation of human rights and/or [international humanitarian law]’: see Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘[Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance](#)’ (26 January 2017), p. 3.

²³⁷Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘[Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance](#)’ (26 January 2017), para. 4.

²³⁸The government provides a checklist for decision-makers to use when conducting an OSJA assessment for capacity-building programmes. This broadly reflects the general OSJA guidance, with additional practical details: see Foreign Commonwealth & Development Office, ‘[Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance – Annex A: Checklist for Capacity Building Overseas](#)’ (26 January 2017).

²³⁹For further examples, see the civil society reports cited throughout this section. See also Harriet Moynihan, ‘[States Must Make Sure Cooperation Does Not Become Complicity](#)’ (Chatham House, 14 November 2016).

Similarly, we do not know in which circumstances the FCDO will refuse assistance on the basis of human rights concerns, or even if any such forms of assistance have ever been rejected on human rights grounds; in fact, OSJA guidance has authorised UK government support leading to the use of the death penalty, despite the UK's longstanding official objection to capital punishment.²⁴⁰

These concerns are further evidenced by our understanding of how the UK operates various forms of assistance in Indonesia. The OSJA appears to have been practically ineffective in reining in the UK government's support for P/CVE operations in Indonesia, for the reasons outlined earlier in this report.²⁴¹ The UK government's overseas assistance to the Indonesian government also appears to correlate with the general concern about the efficacy of OSJA assessments, as expressed by the UK-based human rights organisation Reprieve, which argues that these assessments have failed to prevent the UK government's financial and logistical support for governments that frequently use torture in military, security service and police operations.²⁴²

Given that the human rights concerns regarding Indonesia's counter-terrorism and P/CVE operations should be obvious for practitioners working in the country, the UK government should be taking steps to 'mitigate' these human rights concerns, and at the same time 'strengthen' the Indonesian authorities' capacity to uphold their human rights obligations - as explained in the OSJA guidance. Yet, we find no evidence to suggest that the government is taking these steps; rather, the evidence outlined in this report indicates that the government is supporting human rights violations.

To ensure that UK government departments uphold human rights when engaging in international assistance, OSJA assessments should be reformed to provide tougher and clearer guidance on how to respond to human rights risks in the UK's international engagement, while ensuring greater transparency and accountability around why and how decisions are being made, with consequences imposed when things go wrong. Further, the government should provide further detail on the number of international assistance requests it refuses on human rights grounds, while also explaining in more detail the circumstances in which it declines to assist other governments.



human rights concerns regarding Indonesia's counter-terrorism and P/CVE operations should be obvious for practitioners working in the country

²⁴⁰Note that the OSJA does not create any binding obligations: see Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, '[Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance](#)' (26 January 2017), para. 6.

²⁴²See, for instance, Dan Dolan, '[Ending aid for executions](#)' (Reprieve, 8 June 2020); Maya Foa, '[The British Government is covering up its assistance to torturers and killers worldwide](#)' (OpenDemocracy, 25 November 2016). See also Lydia Day, Frank Ledwidge, Stuart Casey-Maslen and Mark Goodwin-Hudson, '[Avoiding civilian harm in partnered military operations: The UK's responsibility](#)', (Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, 2023), pp. 14-15. This raises another concern with the operation of OSJA decision-making - transparency: see Liam Walpole and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, '[Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK's Response to Conflict](#)' (Oxford Research Group, 2020), pp. 17-29.

UK COMPLICITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

- International law prohibits states from assisting other states in violating international law. If one state perpetrates the most serious human rights violations (including torture), then international law requires other states to help bring an end to these unlawful acts.
- The UK government risks violating international law in its support for rights-violating P/CVE practices in Indonesia, through the methods outlined in previous sections of this report.
- The UK therefore risks breaching its obligations to uphold the freedoms of expression and religion, as well as the prohibitions of unlawful killings, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and enforced disappearances.

This report has found numerous shortcomings in the UK government's approach to international counterterrorism and P/CVE efforts, especially in Indonesia, that raise questions about the UK's compliance with international human rights standards.

The UK is under similar human rights obligations to Indonesia, and is also subject to the European Convention on Human Rights.²⁴³ Under the human rights treaties per se, the UK generally only has formal obligations to respect the rights of people in its jurisdiction or control. However, a failure to prohibit and prosecute complicity in torture by UK nationals – including outside the UK – may violate the Convention against Torture, while complicity in killings, torture, disappearances or other abuses in the context of a conflict (as may be occurring in West Papua) may violate international humanitarian law. As outlined below, complicity in rights violations may also break international law for other reasons. The UK also undermines international human rights law as a whole when it knowingly facilitates violations of the freedom of religion and belief, and when it ignores numerous widely reported allegations that people it is funding or training are engaging in killings, disappearances or torture.

From the analysis above, we have seen that Indonesia's current P/CVE practices violate the country's human rights obligations: there are clear violations of the right to freedom of religion (and, relatedly, the freedom of expression), as well as alleged violations of the rights to life and freedom from torture.

We now assess whether the UK government's support for Indonesia's P/CVE operations, through the means outlined above, may violate its international obligations. To be clear, we conclude that the UK government's active involvement in Indonesian P/CVE efforts may be unlawful in several ways:

- Influence over the creation of the RAN CVE may violate human rights laws related to the freedoms of expression and religion (with the caveat, noted above, about the RAN CVE's limited implementation to date);²⁴⁴



²⁴³Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 3 September 1953, entered into force 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 221. For the UK's ratification status of the UN human rights treaties, see United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland' (UN OHCHR). The European Court of Human Rights has held Member States responsible for assisting human rights violations committed by other states, for instance when it comes to secret detention: see App. No. 39630/09, *El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Judgment, 13 December 2012; App. No. 7511/13, *Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland*, Judgment, 24 July 2014; App. No. 28761/11, *Al Nashiri v. Poland*, Judgment, 24 July 2014; App. No. 44883/09, *Nasr and Ghali v. Italy*, Judgment, 23 February 2016.

²⁴⁴On free expression and free religion, see *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, New York, 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171, Arts. 19(2) and 18 respectively. On child rights, see *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, New York, 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, 1577 UNTS 3, Arts. 2(2), 8, 12-16, 28-30.

the UK government's active involvement in Indonesian P/CVE efforts may be unlawful in several ways

- Training or funding of law enforcement, security service and military entities may further implicate the rights noted in the above bullet-point, as well as the prohibitions on unlawful killings; torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and enforced disappearances.²⁴⁵

The International Law Commission's Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR) explains how states may be held accountable for their complicity in, or other support for, human rights violations.²⁴⁶ While the ASR is not binding, it generally reflects customary international law, which means that it is seen as an authoritative interpretation of the laws that are binding on states.²⁴⁷

Under international law, a state acts unlawfully if it breaches an international law obligation, and this breach is attributable to the state – for instance, if it is committed by the government or a state representative.²⁴⁸ This also extends to 'aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act'.²⁴⁹

As Article 16 of the ASR – which reflects customary international law²⁵⁰ – explains:

'A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:

a) that State does so with the knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act;²⁵¹ and

b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.'²⁵²

²⁴⁵On unlawful killings, see [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights](#), New York, 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 6. On the prohibition of torture, see [Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment](#), New York, 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 85; ICCPR, Art. 7. On enforced disappearances, see [International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance](#), New York, 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010, 2716 UNTS 3; the UK government is not a party to this agreement, and the Indonesian government has not transposed its obligations under the Convention into domestic law, so the applicable law relating to enforced disappearances stems from other human rights treaties or customary international law: see Nikolas Kyriakou, 'The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and its Contributions to International Human Rights Law, with Specific Reference to Extraordinary Rendition' (2012) 13 *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 1, pp. 5-17, which broadly reflects the provisions of the Enforced Disappearances Convention.

²⁴⁶International Law Commission, 'Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries', adopted at the fifty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two. Generally, see Helmut Philipp Aust, [Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility](#) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Anja-Seibert-Fohr, 'From Complicity to Due Diligence: When Do States Incur Responsibility for Their Involvement in Serious International Wrongdoing?' (2017) 60 *German Yearbook of International Law* 667; John Cerone, 'Re-examining International Responsibility: Inter-State Complicity in the Context of Human Rights Violations' (2007-2008) 14 *ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law* 525; Kate Nahopetian, 'Confronting State Complicity in International Law' (2002) 7(1) *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs* 127.

²⁴⁷[Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide \(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro\)](#), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 417; Fernando Lusa Bordin, 'Reflections of Customary International Law: The Authority of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law' (2014) 63(3) *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 535.

²⁴⁸International Law Commission, 'Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries', adopted at the fifty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Article 2.

²⁴⁹[Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide \(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro\)](#), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 432; [Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu](#), Trial Chamber, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 548. Contrast Alexander A.D. Brown, 'To complicity... and beyond! Passive assistance and positive obligations in international law' (2016) 27 *Hague Yearbook of International Law* 133.

²⁵⁰[Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide \(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro\)](#), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 417. However, some commentators disagree with the International Court of Justice's reasoning: see Helmut Philipp Aust, [Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility](#) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 97-191, who addresses these critiques and engages in extensive comparative law analysis of states' approaches to complicity under international law, before concluding that '[w]e are thus faced with a situation in which nearly forty States have commented in a largely favourable manner on the existence of a rule in international law which establishes responsibility for complicity' (at p. 185) and '[i]t can thus be concluded that a general rule on complicity has entered the corpus of customary international law' (at p. 191).

²⁵¹Some court practice suggests that the supporting state must be aware that the act it is supporting is unlawful, however this may be implied in the circumstances, see: [Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide \(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro\)](#), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 421. See, generally, Harriet Mounihan, 'Aiding and Assisting: The Mental Element under Article 16 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility' (2018) 67(2) *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 455.

²⁵²International Law Commission, 'Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries', adopted at the fifty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Article 16. As the law recognises that unlawful international acts can occur with several states acting in coalition: see [Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru \(Nauru v. Australia\)](#), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 240.

Complicity can take many forms, and liability for complicity in violations of international law will depend on the circumstances of the case.²⁵³ For instance, many states recognise that sales or transfers of weapons likely violate this obligation.²⁵⁴ Even the UK – whose practice has involved authorising arms deals for use by Saudi Arabian forces as part of an armed conflict in Yemen²⁵⁵ – recognises that this would assist another state in violating its international law obligations, if there were concrete and reliable evidence to show that the other government was using weapons sent from the UK to violate international law.²⁵⁶ In other contexts, governments and courts have taken the position that providing other forms of material support (such as training or funding) to other states that violate their international law obligations will engage the legal responsibility of the supporting state.²⁵⁷

Additionally, in 2009, and in response to widespread allegations of torture and unlawful detention facilitated by UK representatives, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) noted that:

‘...in our view, the following situations would amount to complicity in torture, for which the State would be responsible [under the Convention Against Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights]...

- ***A request to a foreign intelligence service, known for its systematic use of torture, to detain and question a terrorism suspect.***
- ***The provision of information to such a foreign intelligence service enabling them to apprehend a terrorism suspect.***

The provision of questions to such a foreign intelligence service to be put to a detainee who has been, is being, or is likely to be tortured.

- ***The sending of interrogators to question a detainee who is known to have been tortured by those detaining and interrogating them.***
- ***The presence of intelligence personnel at an interview with a detainee being held in a place where he is, or might be, being tortured.***
- ***The systematic receipt of information known or thought likely to have been obtained from detainees subjected to torture.’***²⁵⁸

To ensure that UK government departments uphold human rights when engaging in international assistance, OSJA assessments should be reformed to provide tougher and clearer guidance on how to respond to human rights risks in the UK’s international engagement, while ensuring greater transparency and accountability around why and how decisions are being made, with consequences imposed when things go wrong. Further, the government should provide further detail on the number of international assistance requests it refuses on human rights grounds, while also explaining in more detail the circumstances in which it declines to assist other governments.²⁵⁸

²⁵³See *Horgan v. An Taoiseach and Others* [2003] IEHC 64, para. 174.

²⁵⁴For a summary, see Alexandra Boivin, ‘*Complicity and beyond: international law and the transfer of small arms and light weapons*’ (2005) 87(859) *International Review of the Red Cross* 467.

²⁵⁵Jon Stone, ‘*British arms sales to Saudi Arabian regime three times higher than previously thought, investigation finds*’ (The Independent, 14 July 2021); Dan Sabbagh, ‘*UK authorised £1.4bn of arms sales to Saudi Arabia after exports resumed*’ (The Guardian, 9 February 2021).

²⁵⁶In *R (on the application of Campaign Against Arms Trade) v. Secretary of State for International Trade* [2019] EWCA Civ 1020, the UK government argued that its internal mechanisms for reviewing arms deals complied with international law and effectively considered whether the use of arms would violate international law (see paras. 37–42).

²⁵⁷*Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)*, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14; *Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania)*, Judgment, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4; *Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia*, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment, 15 September 2005; Erika De Wet, ‘*Complicity in Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Incumbent Governments through Direct Military Assistance on Request*’ (2018) 67(2) *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 287; Teppei Kasai, ‘*Japan to Train New Cadets, Officers from Abusive Myanmar Military*’ (Human Rights Watch, 27 April 2022); Marko Milanovic, ‘*Intelligence Sharing in Multinational Military Operations and Complicity under International Law*’ (2021) 97 *International Law Studies* 1269; Harriet Moynihan, ‘*Aiding and Assisting: Challenges in Armed Conflict and Counterterrorism*’, Chatham House International Law Programme Research Paper (November 2016). Some treaties also explicitly provide distinct obligations prohibiting complicity in unlawful acts.

²⁵⁸House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘*Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture*’, Twenty-Third Report of Session 2008–2009, HL Paper 152, HC 230, 4 August 2009, para. 43.

While the JCHR's list is by no means exhaustive, and is limited to complicity in torture, we can draw several parallels between the situations listed by the JCHR and the support the UK government has given to the Indonesian government on P/CVE, as outlined in the previous sections. Notably, the close advice and assistance – outside the official training process – that UK officers have given their Indonesian counterparts following the conclusion of their JCLEC course demonstrates a similar level of involvement in the latter's approach to P/CVE. Following high-profile incidents of unlawful killings, observers have raised real concerns about how the UK trains other police forces worldwide.²⁵⁹ Moreover, although the JCHR's guidance refers primarily to cases of individual involvement in a specific case, the law is not so limited. Rather we know that states can be complicit in human rights violations if they provide logistical support, financial support, or training to the military, law enforcement, or security service actors at a higher, or more general, level.²⁶⁰

As well as aiding or assisting a violation of international law, to be complicit in the breach, the UK government must have offered 'significant' assistance. Although, on the face of it, this standard may appear to indicate a high level of aid or assistance, the International Law Commission advises that even more 'incidental' forms of aid or assistance may be sufficient.²⁶¹ In any case, the aid or assistance does not need to directly cause a breach of international law, and in this instance a breach of human rights law.²⁶²

The evidence outlined above demonstrate that the UK's support for rights-violating P/CVE policies goes far beyond merely ignoring past violations. Rather, we have seen that the UK's express aim in exporting Prevent – itself a rights-violating strategy – has had a direct impact on the formulation of Indonesia's RAN CVE, in turn risking fresh human rights violations.²⁶³ Further, the UK government's training of Indonesian law enforcement, security service and military officers falls plainly within the definition of complicity given by international actors – which is broader than the definition promulgated by the JCHR.

²⁵⁹See Rory James, 'UK government cannot say if it has trained Indonesian police forces implicated in human rights abuse' (AOAV, 3 September 2021). On the allegations of unlawful killings generally, see Sebastian Strangio, 'Indonesian Security Forces Responsible for Dozens of Extrajudicial Killings, Rights Group Says' (The Diplomat, 13 December 2022); V Arianti and Muh Taufiqurrohmah, 'Extremist charities spread in Indonesia' (East Asia Forum, 17 March 2020); Mohammad Hasan Ansori, Imron Rasyid, Muhamad Arif, Sopar Peranto, Johari Efendi, Vidya Hutagalung, 'Memberantas Terorisme di Indonesia: Praktik Kebijakan dan Tantangan' (Habibie Center, August 2019), Chapter V; Pizaro Gozali Idrus and Tria Dianti, 'Activists blame Indonesian police, soldiers for dozens of extrajudicial killings' (Benar News, 9 December 2022).

²⁶⁰As international lawyer Helmut Philipp Aust explains: 'Complicity can consist in logistical or military support for conduct which violates international humanitarian law. This support can be closely related to actual violations of humanitarian law on the ground. It could conceivably also be more remote in terms of advice given by military advisors or in the granting of rights of passage for troops which later commit violations of international humanitarian law.' See Helmut Philipp Aust, 'Complicity in violations of international humanitarian law', in Heike Krieger, *Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 442.

²⁶¹International Law Commission, 'Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries', adopted at the fifty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Article 16, paras. 5 and 10. For a practical explanation, see Helmut Philipp Aust, *Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 195-230.

²⁶²Helmut Philipp Aust, *Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 212-213.

²⁶³As noted above, many experts, including the interviewees questioned for this report, suggested that the RAN CVE has yet to have practical impact. That is expected to change in the near future.

Conclusion

Indonesia's approach to CT and P/CVE causes direct and tangible harms, particularly to communities that already face prejudice and discrimination as a result of existing government policies. There have been numerous and widely reported allegations of unlawful killings, torture and enforced disappearances, and we conclude that the government's approach also violates the freedoms of expression, assembly and religion. These rights violations are often accompanied by a lack of accountability, causing victims to go without redress.

Within the country's large Muslim-majority population, we have seen that the government uses P/CVE to target people who belong to so-called 'deviant' strands of the religion, including people who do not incite or otherwise express support for violent acts. The government has pursued these policies under the guise of 'religious moderation', 'religious tolerance' or even Pancasila. In using these justifications, it seeks to gain public support for its actions and further ostracise the groups and communities that are most likely to critique government policy.

The other group most affected by Indonesia's P/CVE approach is people in Papua/West Papua, including indigenous and environmental rights defenders. The police, military, security services and private security companies are highly active in the region, with alleged killings, torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearances occurring in recent years. Dozens of indigenous Papuans have also been arrested and charged with offences carrying lengthy prison terms, principally under the heading of 'treason', while the government has designated and charged protesters – both from Papua/West Papua and elsewhere in the country – as 'extremists' and 'terrorists'.

The UK government is or should be well aware of these rights violations and potential violations, but appears to have taken the decision to ignore well publicised allegations of human rights abuses, creating ever-closer relationships with its Indonesian counterparts as part of its foreign policy 'tilt' towards the Indo-Pacific region.

In this report, we have shown how the UK funds harmful P/CVE projects in Indonesia (and indeed worldwide), including some which advocate that people change their beliefs under the guise of 'religious tolerance' or 'religious moderation'.

It has also supported community-policing-related projects in Indonesia, where the police and the government encourage citizens to surveil their neighbours – with a particular focus on neighbours who hold specific beliefs (those who are already marginalised in their communities and Indonesian society more broadly).

We also conclude that the UK has supported Indonesia's P/CVE approach by training police officers – and potentially also members of the military – from forces that then conduct P/CVE operations. There are some high-profile examples of officers from these forces who have been accused of torture, unlawful killings and enforced disappearances following their training at the JCLEC. While the UK government often claims that Prevent – the UK's domestic P/CVE programme – is not a policing strategy, evidently this is not the case when it comes to the UK's engagement with the police and military overseas. (We also argue that the UK version of Prevent is in fact a policing programme, even though the government does not publicly define it as such.)

Further, our research suggests that the UK was involved in the formulation and drafting of Indonesia's P/CVE strategy, the RAN CVE. We heard from an interviewee with direct knowledge that members of the drafting committee had copies of the UK's Prevent strategy next to them when drafting the RAN CVE, for example. When we contacted the UK government to understand the degree of its involvement in creating Indonesia's RAN CVE, it told us that it did hold information about its role, but declined our request to gain access to this information.

The UK government's support for Indonesia's P/CVE approach is emblematic of its wider Prevent practices, both domestically and internationally: side-lining human rights laws, removing transparency and obscuring accountability processes. In the UK, the government created a counter-extremism strategy that violates fundamental rights, including many of the rights we argue are being violated as part of Indonesia's P/CVE strategy. We conclude that this is not a coincidence, and that the UK is either knowingly supporting repression and violence for its own political reasons, or choosing to ignore abundant evidence that Indonesian police, military and intelligence agencies are engaging in them.

Recommendations

1. The UK government should scrap its International Prevent Programme, to ensure that the country complies with international human rights laws. It should:

- Scrap the International Prevent Programme, as Prevent remains a discriminatory and rights-violating strategy.
- The UK should avoid advocating for other governments to adopt Prevent-style strategies that infringe on fundamental rights, including by failing to respect the freedom of religion.
- The UK should create greater transparency about the support it provides to other governments and civil society actors engaging in P/CVE efforts. The government should also publish human rights impact assessments of these activities.

2. The UK government should reform how it assists other governments in creating new national-security-related laws and policies, ensuring that these comply with international human rights laws. It should:

- Mandate respect for human rights in its advice and assistance for other governments engaging in national security-related law and policy reform.
- Conduct an extensive human rights legal analysis and publicise this when assisting governments in law and policy reform on national-security-related matters. This should explain why the government believes it is complying with its international obligations, including those prohibiting complicity in violations of human rights or other aspects of international law.

3. The UK government should reform how it trains and otherwise assists other countries' police forces and militaries, to ensure that it is not complicit in violations of international law. It should:

- Mainstream respect for human rights throughout its training and other assistance for other countries' police and military.
- Provide evidence to support its claims that the police and military officers it has trained have not been deployed to Papua/West Papua.

- Ensure that it operates transparently in its assessments of the human rights situation in other countries where it provides support to the police or military (in the form of training, financing, or other means). This would require it to demonstrate what it is doing to prevent human rights violations resulting from its support.
- Ensure that it operates transparently in its training of other countries' police and military forces. This would require transparency regarding whom the UK trains, on what topics, in which circumstances, and how. In the Indonesian context, it would require transparency as to what training the UK provides through the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), and how it funds this institution.

4. The UK government should overhaul its system of Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA), to provide greater scrutiny for international projects that violate fundamental human rights. It should:

- Avoid advising other governments on law and policy reforms that would mimic its own strategies, when there are tangible and well evidenced concerns about whether those domestic laws and policies comply with human rights laws.
- Mainstream human rights throughout its OSJA assessment process.
- Give greater weight to human rights compliance when conducting OSJA assessments. This would require the government to refrain from assisting in law reform initiatives and other forms of assistance where this could lead to serious and/or widespread human rights violations.
- Ensure that it operates its OSJA assessments transparently. This transparency should include the ways the government conducts OSJA assessments, and how it responds when an assessment raises concerns about potential human rights violations. The government should also provide statistics about the number of requests for international assistance that are refused on human rights grounds.

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